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Nov. 21, 1876. Collection of Lois Gahl. Photographs: Jack A.
Hiller and Richard H. W. Brauer.
"The scene takes place in a country store to which the
mother has brought her baby to be weighed on the grocer's scale
... She has placed the child on the scale on the counter and
smiles with pride as she sees the high weight indicated. Neither
see the mischievious little boy, who by stealthily tugging at the
blanket, has caused this phenomenal gain. The sculptor's wife
posed for the role of the mother; the small boy at work on the
blanket, his son, Charles." john Rogers' Group of Statuary, A Pictorial
Annotated Guide Jar the CoUectar by Paul and Meta Bleier, 1971.
John Rogers was probably the most popular American
sculptor ever. He sold about 80,000 of his plaster statuettes
between 1860 and 1893. Weighing the Baby was considered
especially appropriate for doctors' offices.
The Cressel

INLUCETUA

A Tradition of Care
I wear ties more often than does the editor who
usually writes this column. Unfortunately, I do not keep
track of the sartorial times. Already a year ago a student
kindly exclaimed of one of my favorites, "My Grandfather
has a tie just like that!" Fortunately, at Christmas, my wife
and children came to my rescue with some more up-to-date
models. But I was happy to discover that the new style has
brought back into vogue an old favorite that had hung
around my closet unused for a decade.
Have we missed the bioethical bandwagon?
Well-rooted religious traditions also struggle to keep
track of the secular times, as, for example, the burgeoning
academic and health care cottage industry of biomedical
ethics. In 1983 Martin Marty said of the Lutherans that
while they "may well have much to say about morals and
ethics" on the basis of their "centuries-old" tradition, they
more or less missed the bioethical bandwagon of the
seventies and eighties (Health arul Medicine in the Lutheran
Tradition, 122). Lutherans mostly went on in the same old
congregational fashion, compensating for their "meager
understanding or lack of action in the field of social justice
by wanting to see themselves and be seen as caring,
effecting works of charity, as individuals and in
congregations" ( 115).
Much has changed since 1983, and Lutherans now
more regularly contribute to bioethical debates. Still, the
Hastings Center, a focus for biomedical ethical research,
was prompted to ask in 1989, "What has happened to the
voice of religion in biomedical ethics?" Evidently other
religious traditions as well as the Lutheran appeared to be
failing to keep up with the times.
Bioethics is going back to the future
As with ties, however, so with health care ethics.
Sometimes what was out of fashion comes back into
fashion. Sometimes the times change rapidly enough so
that what had for centuries been the fashion in the
religious communities becomes a passion in the secular
culture. The essays and reviews in this issue of the Cresset
focus on contemporary developments in health care, and
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the authors richly document how the emphasis on
communal care for those who are ill-an emphasis central
to the life and ministry of Lutheran and other religious
communities--is receiving renewed attention in the secular
culture.
The essays by Lysaught, Lauritzen, Langerak, and
Droege, and the reviews of William May's The Patient's
Ordeal and Stanley Hauerwas' Naming the Silences: God,
medicine, arul the Problem of Suffering show in detail how both
religious and nonreligious bioethicists and health care
professionals are attending more carefully to the moral and
religious significance of patients' illnesses and their
suffering. The world of contemporary bioethics is
discovering that health care has as much to do with
patients and their life stories as with bodies and their
diseases. A renewed focus on what complete care for
patients actually requires is emerging alongside the wellestablished bioethical preoccupation with advising health
care professionals concerning their moral dilemmas.
Lutherans, along with participants in other religious
communities, have a centuries-old, venerable history and
continuing tradition of equipping and encouraging pastors
and people to be with the sick in their suffering and to
help the sick incorporate the story of their illnesses into the
story of the community's faith.
But where will we find the resources?
Just at this point a significant question arises for
secularized health care and bioethics. Marty indicates that
the theology and practice of caring comes naturally to
Lutheran and other religious communities. "The Western
religious traditions that derive from the Bible show such
consistent concern for care that they hardly need
depiction .... to show care is one of the most affirmative
ways to demonstrate the steadfast love of God who works
through human beings" (67). These religious traditions
have an abundance of resources for encouraging the
community to stand by the sick in their suffering and for
helping the sick put the story of their illness into a larger,
coherent story of the community's life. How will a
fragmented, secularized society find the resources to
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encourage people to hazard standing with patients in their
illnesses and to tell a story that brings meaning to a
patient's suffering? As Lysaught says in her essay,
[P]otential for deriving meaning from suffering lies
not in some inherent quality suffering possesses, nor in the
abilities of its victims. It lies rather in the resources offered
by society and in the willingness of individuals to
participate in this process, to enter into solidarity, to pay
"attention" to those who suffer.
Lacking resources, we fatally abbreviate the story.
I see little evidence that our secular society has the
resources required. Consider the matter of care for the
dying. Strong currents in the U.S. and elsewhere threaten
to sweep us toward physician-assisted suicide as the best
"care" we can offer to those whose dying puts them (and
us) into distress. This way of "caring" requires little in the
way of willingness to participate in a neighbor's suffering
and provides only the most abbreviated of stories into
which the sufferer may incorporate her sorrow. Popular
arguments in favor of legalizing a speedy, Final Exit do not
receive a welcome in communities that have a centuries-old
tradition of genuine care for the dying. As a Roman
Catholic writer puts it: "Suicide by vulnerable members of
society is a sign that the community has failed to embody
the trust that sustains life and to live out its commitment to
protect and comfort the dying, the sick and the elderly."
(Origins, Nov. 7, 1991,21:22, 348)
Unhappily, even the main secular arguments against
physician-assisted suicide do not usually draw upon
religious insights concerning care. The secular arguments
dwell mostly on concerns about abuse and dangerous
consequences rather than on a careful analysis of what care
for the dying really demands and what telling the story of a
life's end might require.
To put disease and suffering into the perspective of a
coherent life story requires having a story worth telling.
Alasdair Macintyre predicts that modern society, shaped as
it is by secular individualism, will be ill-equipped to tell any
coherent, public story about suffering. In Whose Justice,
Which Rationality 7 he describes modern individualists:
[T] hey tend to live betwixt and between, accepting usually
unquestioningly the assumptions of the dominant liberal
individualist forms of public life, but drawing in different areas of
their lives upon a variety of tradition-generated resources of
thought and action, transmitted from a variety of familial,
religious, educational, and other social and cultural sources. This
type of self which has too many half-convictions and too few
settled coherent convictions, too many partly formulated
alternatives and too few opportunities to evaluate them
systematically, brings to its encounters with the claims of rival
traditions a fundamental incoherence which is too disturbing to
be admitted to self-conscious awareness except on the rarest of
occasions" ( 397).
How will such fragmented selves find the resources to
structure society in ways that will bring not only medicine
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for diseased bodies but care for suffering persons? In Out of
Solitude Henri Nouwen explains why entering into solidarity
with a person's suffering requires so much of us.
[W]e feel quite uncomfortable with an invitation to enter
into someone's pain before doing something about it. Still, when
we honestly ask ourselves which persons in our lives mean the
most to us, we often find that it is those who, instead of giving
much advice, solutions, or cures, have chosen rather to share our
pain and touch our wounds with a gentle and tender hand. . ...
But are we ready to really experience our powerlessness in the
face of death and say: 'I do not understand. I do not know what
to do but I am here with you.' . . . Our tendency is to run away
from the painful realities or to try to change them as soon as
possible. But cure without care makes us into rulers, controllers,
manipulators, and prevents a real community from taking shape.
(34,36)

Will we debate health care allocation with care?
Bioethicists have been predicting that in the nineties
concern with social justice and health care allocation will
become the focus of intense national debate in the U .S.
The media have been bringing the problems and questions
about just allocation to the fore, and the political
community now regularly highlights these topics. I have not
yet seen much evidence that the renewed focus in
contemporary bioethics on caring for persons as well as
curing bodies is making its way into into this rapidly
expanding dialog on health care allocation. As a people we
will have addressed the allocation problems in a
dangerously lopsided way if we discuss only how to make
treatment available to diseased bodies rather than how to
make humane care available to people who suffer from
their illnesses. But perhaps society at large simply lacks the
resources to make this part of the debate.
Lutherans, along with other Christians, with Jews, and
with Muslims, have coherent, comprehensive and
compelling stories to tell that illuminate the stories of
illness intertwined with the diseases of bodies. These
traditional stories also illuminate the significance of other
societal ills, such as poverty, illiteracy, and the breakdown
of moral civility. Perhaps if our society will learn to debate
not only how to bring treatment to diseased bodies but also
how to bring genuine care to people who are ill, we will
also find resources for renewing a puzzled, fragmented
pluralism in ways that make the telling of coherent life
stories possible again, without shipping the whole affair off
to a hypothetical future, as Jim Combs suggests we are too
willing to do.
In any case, Lutheran communities will go on caring,
both when caring is in vogue and when it is not.
Faithfulness to the tradition demands it. And this
faithfulness provides models for a society that may become
willing to learn again what genuine care is all about.
James V. Bachman, john R Eckrich
Professor of Religion and the Healing Arts
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EXPERIENCE AS TRUTH?
FEMINIST ETHICS, EXPERIENCE AND REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY
Paul Lauritzen
Let me begin with a passage from Ursula LeGuin. It
comes from a commencement address she gave to
graduating seniors at Bryn Mawr College. Throughout the
address she insists that "reason is a faculty far larger than
mere objective thought" (148), and she urges the students
always to attend to their experience in searching for truth.
"Early this spring," she writes:
I met a musician, the composer Pauline Oliveros, a
beautiful woman like a grey rock in a streambed; and to a group
of us, women, who were beginning to quarrel over theories in
abstract, objective language . . . Pauline, who is sparing with
words, said . . . "Offer your experience as your truth." There was a
short silence. When we started talking again , we didn't talk
objectively, and we didn't fight. We went back to feeling our way
into ideas, using the whole intellect not half of it. ... We tried to
offer our experience to one another. Not claiming: offering
something (LeGuin, 150) .
LeGuin ' s words here echo the thoughts of many
feminists who have argued recently that moral philosophy
and religious ethics have too long been conducted in "the
language of the father." Traditional moral philosophy, it
has been argued, has not attended sufficiently to the
concrete, particular experiences of individual moral agents
as they attempt to live their lives morally as best they can.
There is more than a little truth in this accusation,
even if it is not the whole truth. Captivated by a natural
science model, many moral philosophers have indeed
sought a sort of objectivity that requires abstracting from
the particular circumstances of an individual's existence
and that demands discounting one's emotional responses
to moral issues. Taking the putative objectivity,
detachment, and neutrality of the scientific investigator as
a paradigm, some have tried to eliminate the importance
of self-understanding in the moral life, for fear that
impartiality would be hopelessly compromised otherwise.
In this view, the way to secure objectivity and impartiality is
to abstract from concrete existence, to set aside one's
Paul Lauritzen teaches in Religious Studies at John Carroll
University in 0/eveland. This article was originally presented at
the Centre for Human Bioethics at Monash University,
Melbourne, Australia. This is his first appearance in The
Cresset.
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experience. (See Taylor 1985)
I have argued in a number of places that our
emotional responses to particular issues may be an
important source of moral insight. so I am deeply
sympathetic to LeGuin's plea that we recover what she calls
"the mother tongue," a language that resists abstraction,
that is unavoidably and proudly subjective. At the same
time, I think we need to ask whether conversation will
really move along as smoothly as LeGuin suggests it will
once we recognize and value the importance of
experience. To be sure, there is value in giving voice to
experiences that have previously gone unspoken. Yet, what
are we to do once such experiences are articulated? Are
there not real and inescapable difficulties here, even if we
"feel our way into ideas"? Can we really expect the fighting
and arguing to stop, once appeals to experience have a
central place in moral deliberation?
I am currently completing a book on the ethical
issues raised by modern reproductive technology. This
book grows out of my own experience in treating for
infertility. Indeed, the specific project from which the idea
for the book came was a paper I wrote for the Hastings
Center Report in which I examined feminist objections to
reproductive technology in light of my own infertility
experience (Lauritzen 1990). That paper was unlike
anything I had previously written. I discussed in detail my
infertility problem, the various tre'a trnents my wife and I
were offered and undertook, and my reactions to these
treatments. I returned to my experiences repeatedly in the
paper in an attempt to complement my discussion of the
theoretical and principled objections raised by many
feminists to these practices. I argued-asserted, reallythat, at its best, moral reflection should involve precisely
this sort of dialectical movement between general
principles and our reactions to particular cases.
I have tried to maintain that dialectic in the book,
and I have tried as well to offer a more systematic
discussion of how appeals to experience can usefully
function in moral deliberation. That is the topic of this
paper.
There are primarily three ways in which I make use of
personal experience in reflecting morally on assisted
reproduction. The first and most narrow use has to do with
the attempt to corroborate specific but general claims
5

made about reproductive technologies by asking whether
such claims are in fact borne out in actual infertility
treatment. Consider, for example, the claim, often made by
opponents of reproductive technology, that the use of new
reproductive techniques inevitably results in the treatment
of human beings as products or commodities. Some
feminists, for instance, have argued that reproductive
medicine treats women as "living laboratories" in which
body parts or systems are manipulated without sufficient
knowledge about the consequences of such manipulation
(Rowland 1987). Others have claimed that assisted
reproduction has broken down the process of procreation
into the joining of discrete bodily parts that are, in theory,
available for sale as commodities (Corea 1985). Still others
have suggested that the obsessive pursuit of biological
parenthood fueled by the new reproductive technologies
(NRTs) results in an equally obsessive concern about the
"quality" of the product, i.e., the child, manufactured by
this technology (Davis 1988).
Although each of these claims can be evaluated
independently of how individuals or couples experience
infertility treatment, each nevertheless also has
implications about the nature of such treatment that make
appeals to experience relevant. If reproductive technology
is indeed dehumanizing; if it results in the treatment of
persons as products; if children are in fact reduced to
products in its wake, then we should expect that at least
reflective people undergoing infertility treatment will
report feeling degraded, objectified or excessively
concerned about the "quality" of the children they seek. In
other words, there ought to be at least some
correspondence between the abstract claims made about
the dangers of reproductive technology and the reports of
those who are said to be at risk.
Thus I suggest that in considering the claim that
reproductive technologies lead, say, to the
commodification of children, it is indeed relevant to report
that my wife and I found it very difficult to resist the goaloriented "production" mentality that pervades infertility
treatment. This fact does not alone, of course, establish the
validity of the claims about the commodification of
reproduction, but it does lend some support to the claim
that, once procreation is separated from sexual
intercourse, it is difficult not to treat procreation as the
production of an object to which one has a right as the
producer. This was certainly our experience: once we
entered the world of reproductive medicine, it was difficult
not to place the end above the means; effectiveness in
accomplishing one's goals easily becomes the sole criterion
by which decisions are made.
In suggesting that appeals to personal experience
may serve a sort of corroborating function I am also, by
implication, suggesting that the actual experience of
treating for infertility may generate insights about assisted
reproduction not easily accessible in other ways. This
points to the second way in which I think attention to
6

personal experience can be important. At a number of
points I rely upon my own experience to. draw attention to
features of assisted reproduction that would not be readily
noticed from outside. Let me give an example. Although a
number of writers have commented upon the danger of
coercion that arises with modern reproductive technology,
these discussions have generally focused on one of two
forms of coercion. Critics have generally focused either on
the social pressure placed on childless women to use
reproductive technology in order to escape the stigma of
childlessness, or on a possible future in which women
might be coerced to use reproductive technologies to
diagnose and correct genetic defects.
Although these forms of coercion are worrisome and
certainly need to be addressed, no one, so far as I know,
has drawn attention to a third way in which reproductive
technology may exert a sort of coercive pressure, a possible
form of coercion that my own experience revealed.
Let me try to explain. While I did not feel coerced in
either of the two senses previously discussed, I nevertheless
felt coerced, in some sense, by the very existence of
reproductive technology. That is, while I did not feel that
my social identity was threatened by childlessness - and
therefore that I had no choice about undergoing unwanted
treatment- and while there was certainly no threat either
actual or implied concerning the possibility of declining
treatment altogether, nevertheless I felt as if I had no
choice but to pursue the reproductive technologies made
available to me. Yet what sense, if any, can we give to the
notion that in being offered a choice, one loses options?
Consider this question in relation to in vitro
fertilization (IVF) technology. The very existence of IVF
changes the experience of infertility in ways that are not
salutary. One of the peculiar aspects of infertility is that it is
typically a condition that a couple suffers. Individuals can
have retrograde ejaculation or blocked tubes, but in most
cases only couples are infertile. As Leon Kass has noted,
infertility is as much a relationship as a condition (Kass
1985). Yet infertility treatment leads us to view infertility
individually, with unfortunate consequences. The reason is
that couples will often not be seen together in infertility
treatment and, even when they are, they will receive
individual workups and be presented with individual
treatment options. It might be said that providing
individuals with options increases agency rather
diminishing it. Yet with this agency comes a responsibility
that may not itself be chosen and which reduces the
prospects for genuine choice here. For once an individual
is presented with a treatment option, not to pursue it is, in
effect, to choose childlessness and to accept responsibility
for it. From a situation in which infertility is a relational
problem for which no one is to blame, it becomes an
individual problem for which a woman or man who refuses
treatment is to blame. Reproductive technology thus
structures the alternatives such that a patient is "free" to
pursue every available form of assisted reproduction or to
The Cresset

choose to be childless.

I hope it is clear that such a choice may be decidedly
unwanted. The problem, however, is that if the technology
is available and it is offered as the only hope to overcome
infertility, such a choice is inescapable: one must choose.
And a person may well feel that he or she has little choice.
To reject in vitro fertilization, for example, is to accept
responsibility for one's childlessness. Indeed, even where
there is a supportive partner involved, the possibility for
blame inevitably arises. Thus, a person confronting
reproductive technology may well feel like he or she must
at least try it, if only once. In other words, the mere
availability of the technology appears to exert a sort of
tyrannical pressure to use it.
This problem is compounded by the fact that
infertility specialists simply assume that individuals will
pursue all available treatments and typically present the
variety of treatment options as just different points on the
same therapeutic spectrum. Different points on the
spectrum are distinguished primarily by the degree of
invasiveness of the respective treatment. In my case, taking
relatively mild drugs in an effort to make an incontinent
bladder muscle more efficient lies at one end of the
continuum, at the other end of which lies IVF. Surgery, I
suppose, falls somewhere in the middle. Only once in my
treatment, however, did anyone suggest that there exists a
difference in kind among treatments. It was generally
assumed that if one therapy failed, we would simply move
on to the next. And that is part of the problem, and one
that is perhaps best appreciated from within the world of
reproductive medicine: If the technology exists, the
expectation is that it will be used . If surgery might repair
the problem, even if the chances are not great, how can I
not have surgery? If surgery and artificial insemination
have not worked, but IVF might, how can I not try IVF?
The unquestioned expectation that everything that can be
tried should and will be tried itself makes it difficult to
decide against trying.
The third way, then, in which appeals to personal
experience function in my work is analogous to the role
played by "moral conceptions" and "moral sensibilities" in
what john Rawls calls "reflective equilibrium" and to which
he later added the adjective "wide" (Rawls 1971 ; 1974/75).
Reflective equilibrium is a method of theory testing in
ethics by virtue of which one seeks to arrive at a coherent
moral scheme in which there is a fit among a set of moral
principles, and one's considered moral judgments--which
incorporate moral conceptions and moral sensibilitiesconsidered in light of the best competing moral theories.
As Rawls describes the process:
One tries to see how people would fit their various
convictions [including convictions about particular acts and
institutions] into one coherent scheme, each considered
conviction whatever its level having a certain initial credibility. By
dropping and revising some, by reformulating and expanding
February 1992

others, one supposes that a systematic organization can be
found."
(Rawls 1974/75: 8)
Because I am not interested in either offering or
testing an ethical theory, much less a theory of justice, it
would be misleading to suggest that I will make use of the
method of reflective equilibrium in assessing modern
reproductive medicine. Nevertheless, the sort of back-andforth movement Rawls envisions between general moral
principles and particular judgments as one seeks to reach
reflective equilibrium about a moral theory provides a
useful model for depicting how appeals to personal
experience can fruitfully be used.
Yet because, as I said, Rawls is interested in the idea of
reflective equilibrium primarily as a method of theory
acceptance in ethics, this notion does not fully model the
function of appeals to experience in my book. For in
considering individual reaction to particular cases of
assisted reproduction and to normative and descriptive
judgments about these cases, I am not attempting to test an
ethical theory so much as I am attempting to "test" the
particular normative and descriptive judgments themselves.
Thus, I have supplemented the model of reflective
equilibrium with an account of how one ought to test
particular normative judgments offered by the philosopher
Morton White (White 1981). According to White,
justification in ethics should be modeled on the epistemic
holism that Quine and others have brought to justification
in science. In this view, one does not test descriptive
statements or beliefs individually but rather one tests
aggregates of statements or beliefs. Quine, for example,
rejects the notion that individual beliefs can be tested by
comparing them to reality and insists, instead, that we
evaluate bodies of beliefs. For Quine, it is these bodies of
beliefs that give rise to predictions about what sensory
experiences to expect under given circumstances. If these
experiences are not realized under the appropriate
circumstances, we may need to question the entire system.
For it was the system or body of beliefs that generated the
prediction, not just an individual belief. As is well known,
in Quine's view, in this testing procedure nothing is
immune to revision. We may decide that our experience
was mistaken, but we may equally decide that what we took
to be a "law" of nature is inaccurate, or even that
established canons of logic must be discarded. What we
seek is a body of descriptive beliefs that may be used as a
tool for organizing or linking sensory experiences. And we
make adjustments within this body of beliefs if there are
recalcitrant sensory experiences.
According to White, much the same view can be
taken toward justification in ethics. Just as we do not test
descriptive judgments individually or in isolation, neither
do we test normative judgments that way. Rather we test
normative judgments in a "corporatistic" manner. What
this means in practice is that in testing particular normative
judgments, we must attend both to the descriptive and
moral beliefs that lead to a particular normative conclusion
7

and to our moral reactions to that conclusion. If our
reactions do not support the conclusion, then we find
ourselves in a situation analogous to that in which a sensory
experience has not confirmed the body of scientific beliefs
that predicted a different sensory experience. We are thus
led, says White, to seek a revision somewhere among the
components of the body of beliefs that led to this
conclusion.
White provides a nice example to illustrate his point.
"Suppose," he writes, "that a mother has taken the life of a
fetus that she has been carrying, and suppose that we
present the following arguments:"
(I) Whoever takes the life of a human being does
something that ought not to be done.
(2) The mother took the life of a fetus in her
womb.
(3) Every living fetus in the womb of a human
being is a human being. Therefore,
(4) The mother took the life of a human being.
Therefore,
(5) The mother did something that ought not to
be done.

In White's view, justification in ethics is such that if
we deny that the woman in this example did something
that ought not to be done, then we may be led to question
the entire set of beliefs--both normative and descriptivethat gave rise to the moral judgment stated in (5). In
White's words, "... we may amend or surrender a law of
logic like that which gets us from (2) and (3) to ( 4); an
ethical law like (1); or a descriptive statement like (2), (3),
or (4)." Moreover, as White makes clear, we may be led to
deny (5), and thus to question (1)-(4) precisely on the
basis of feelings we have about this case. Indeed, for White,
the feelings of obligation we have in connection with
particular normative judgments are analogous to the
sensory experiences that play so important a role in the
justification of descriptive judgments in science. Just as we
may be led to revise some body of descriptive beliefs
because, say, a particular powder is not white, as we
predicted it would be, so we may be led to revise our
normative judgments about particular cases if our feelings
reject the conclusions we have reached. (It is important to
say that we may also need to revise our feelings in such a
situation. White does not always hold this possibility clearly
in view.)
That our emotions should be given such a prominent
place in moral deliberation will strike some as mistaken;
that they should be allowed to influence our description of
the world will seem to many simply absurd. Yet this is what
White suggests and, in many ways, I follow this suggestion
in my appeals to personal experience in my book.
For it seems to me that traditional moral theory has
not paid sufficient attention to the role of what Bernard
Williams has called "spontaneous convictions" in moral
deliberation (Williams 94). By spontaneous conviction I
mean the untheorized and often passionate responses we
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have to particular moral issues. When my students
routinely reject Michael Tooley's well known defense of
infanticide, they often do so, at least initially, because they
are emotionally repulsed by the prospect of killing an
infant. This repulsion is their spontaneous conviction
about infanticide. Tooley dismisses such a response as
merely "visceral "-akin, he says, "to the reaction of
previous generations to masturbation or oral sex" (Tooley
1972). Yet I see no reason to dismiss such responses so
quickly. (We may, with Jeff Stout in Ethics After Babel assert
that "the myth of the given is as naive and misleading in
morals as it is in science." ) On the contrary, I agree with
White that we must take our spontaneous convictions
seriously and that they may indeed lead us to rethink either
a particular normative judgment or a line of argument
leading to a particular moral judgment or both.
Thus in considering the morality of various forms of
assisted reproduction I frequently appeal to my
spontaneous convictions about the issues under
consideration. This appeal to spontaneous convictions,
however, is the beginning, not the end, of a sustained
discussion that may ultimately result in the revision of a
normative judgment, a descriptive judgment, or the
spontaneous conviction itself. As H. Tristram Engelhardt,
Jr. has pointed out, "one often discovers, with chagrin, that
one's most heartfelt convictions are indefensible
prejudices" (Engelhardt 9). So Tooley may indeed be right
that our abhorrence of infanticide is like a previous
generation's disgust at masturbation; but he may be wrong,
too.
The important point is that our initial abhorrence of
infanticide may drive us to reconsider Tooley's argument
about the nature of personhood because we feel that he
cannot but be wrong. Thus our initial response plays a
critical role in moral deliberation. In a similar vein, I
suggest that the spontaneous convictions of those who have
undergone infertility treatment may lead us to reconsider
many of the claims that have been made about forms of
assisted reproduction. Many have argued, for example, that
donor insemination is morally problematic because it is a
form of adultery. Yet my own experience in considering
donor insemination and briefly trying it suggests that,
whatever problems may beset donor insemination, this is
surely not one of them. In other words, my spontaneous
conviction about the claim that donor insemination is a
form of adultery is that such a claim is badly mistaken and
that we must return to the body of beliefs and reasoning
that produced that judgment in order to see where a
mistake has been made.
To summarize, then, I appeal to personal experience
or what I have just called spontaneous conviction in three
ways. First, I seek to corroborate claims made about the
impact of reproductive technologies on those who avail
themselves of them. Second, I draw attention to aspects of
assisted reproduction that are most easily appreciated from
inside the world of modern reproductive medicine. Third,
The Cresset

I make use of personal experience as part of a dialectical
process of moral deliberation in which one seeks a sort of
equilibrium among normative principles and descriptive
beliefs, particular normative judgments and spontaneous
convictions, including emotions.
Since the dialectic process of moving between
concrete experience and principled reflection is central to
my project, let me now try to illustrate this process more
fully. In my article, "What Price Parenthood?", I took up
the charge brought by some feminists that in a culture that
so thoroughly defines a woman's identity in terms of
motherhood, to offer the hope of fertility through
reproductive technology to a childless woman is coercive.
My own experience of feeling coerced and of talking with
infertile couples whose desperation to conceive a child was
palpable led me at the time to conclude that this was a
powerful objection to reproductive technology.
Even at the time, however, I struggled to articulate a
plausible view of "coercion" that would allow us to say of
infertile individuals that they were coerced. I suggested
that we distinguish "coercive" threats from "coercive"
offers, and that the latter was a "soft" form of coercion that
was nevertheless real and troubling.
The more I thought about coercion, and the
experience of feeling coerced, the more I tried to
articulate a view of coercion that would make sense of my
experience, however, the less satisfied I became with this
analysis. Indeed, I now believe that the possibility of
coercion is not an overwhelming obstacle to the use of
reproductive technology. Consider, for example, the claim
that access to in vitro fertilization should be restricted to
avoid coercion. Although continual demonstrable coercion
would be grounds for opposing IVF, there are good
reasons for doubting that widespread coercion occurs in
connection with IVF programs. Consider first the claims
about coercive offers. The idea of a coercive offer is
admittedly an important one. For example, it properly
draws our attention to the fact that defining liberty in
strictly negative terms as freedom-from is not wholly
adequate. It also allows us a way of conceptualizing the sort
of subtle, often economic, pressure that may render an
unforced decision also un-free. Acknowledging the
existence of coercive offers allows us to say that "choices"
made out of poverty or despair may not be truly free,
however clearly the consequences of this action or its
alternatives have been set out. It allows us to say, for
example, that the woman who sells sexual services in order
to feed her children may have been forced into doing so,
despite the absence of interference from others.
Yet, while acknowledging the value of the idea of
coercive offers in general, we must ask whether it has
significant application in the particular case of individuals
pursuing in vitro fertilization. And in answering this
question the comparison of coercive offers in connection
with prostitution is instructive. This comparison has been
explicitly made by numerous commentators. Gena Corea,
for example, has pointed to how current reproductive
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technology allows us to apply the model of the brothel to
reproduction. "While sexual prostitutes," she writes, "sell
vagina, rectum and mouth, reproductive prostitutes will sell
other body parts: wombs, ovaries, eggs." Presumably she
would also add that reproductive prostitution may result
from coercion in precisely the way that sexual prostitution
does.
But let us take a closer look at this comparison. If we
attend to the possibility of a coercive offer in connection
with prostitution, we see that if we accept such a possibility
we do so largely because we reject what Alison Jaggar
describes as the liberal belief, "that individuals are fulfllled
when they are doing what they have decided freely to do,
however unpleasant, degrading or wrong this may appear
to someone else." In contrast to this "liberal" view, to
accept the possibility that a woman who sells her body has
been coerced by an offer of money for sex is to believe that
the woman does not, and perhaps could not, flourish
under such circumstances, regardless of what good may
come of her actions. It is to believe that selling one's body
in this way is degrading and that a person would not agree
to be so degraded without some element of coercion. The
notion of a coercive offer thus has plausibility here in
direct proportion to the strength of our conviction that
restricting or eliminating sexual prostitution will not
frustrate any legitimate interest or need that having sex
with total strangers fulfills.
Yet if we consider the claim that to offer IVF to a
childless woman may also be coercive, we discover that for
this claim to be plausible we require a conviction
comparable to the belief that eliminating prostitution
opposes no important human values. But this is precisely
what we cannot affirm in the case of IVF, unless we
simultaneously reject or devalue the importance of
begetting and bearing children. Significantly, if we
examine the work of those who have opposed IVF on the
grounds that it may be coercive, we do in fact see a
depreciation of the value of motherhood. For example, in
an article entitled, "'Women Want ~t': In-Vitro Fertilization
and Women's Motivations for Participation", Christine
Crowe argues that women participate in IVF programs
largely because they accept the dominant ideology of
motherhood in western culture, an ideology that includes
the belief that biological motherhood is valuable. "IVF,"
Crowe writes, "relies upon women to perceive motherhood
as desirable" (Crowe 547-48). Or consider Robyn
Rowland's explanation of the pressures facing infertile
women. Under a section heading that reads "Pronatalism
and the Experience oflnfertility," Rowland writes:
To understand the impact of infertility, we need to
understand that we live within a society which says that it is good
to have children. That is, one that has pronatalist values .... the
exclamations of wonder whenever we see something young,
vulnerable, and cuddly such as a kitten are also reinforcing the
desire for children.
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As I indicated above, I certainly do not wish to
dismiss the very real pressures that confront infertile
individuals in our culture. They are real and sometimes
palpable. Still, it -seems to me that both Crowe and
Rowland -and many others who would follow them here
- have confused the socially sanctioned belief that having
children is valuable with a quite different proposition,
namely, that women cannot be fulfilled unless they have
children. To be sure, both these views are powerfully
reinforced in our culture. Yet to conflate them is to fail to
see that women may legitimately value children and choose
to have them in full view of the consequences of this
decision, even when the consequences include the bodily
manipulations of IVF. In other words, even if women are
socialized in our culture to define their identities in terms
of motherhood, if we acknowledge the value of having
children, we must also acknowledge that women may
choose this good independently of the oppressive ideology.
To accept this point, however, is to concede that
regardless of the danger of coercion, we cannot oppose IVF
altogether on the grounds that to make IVF available to a
childless woman is a coercive offer. For a woman may be
choosing IVF not simply because she would feel unfulfilled
if she failed to have children, but because she values having
children in itself. Admittedly, it will often be difficult to
distinguish the latter case from the former, but unless we
are prepared to rule out the possibility that a woman may
legitimately value having children as a good in itself, it is
hard to see on what basis we could justify eliminating access
to IVF. Are those opposed to IVF because it may be
coercive prepared to say of IVF what Simone de Beauvoir
said of childrearing in one's home, that no woman should
be allowed to have that choice, because too many will take
it? Surely, to say that is to trade a "soft" coercion for a very
hard one indeed.
So the more we reflect on the experience of coercion,
the less plausible this objection seems. Again, consider
my experience of feeling that the choices offered by
modern reproductive medicine were coercive in some
sense. I hope it was clear from our earlier discussion of this
claim that, in one sense, this objection is a variation of the
concern that providing IVF to infertile couples is to make a
coercive offer. For, again, the underlying concern is that
IVF is offered in a context in which genuine choice appears
to be limited. Here, however, attention is focused, not on
the social pressure to choose IVF, but on the way in which
the choice itself is now structured: choose IVF and remain
blameless if it does not work or accept responsibility for
one's childlessness. I have already reported that I felt the
pressure of this choice powerfully during infertility
treatment, and I have no doubt that others have felt
similarly. Still, should the possibility of unwanted choices
lead us to oppose IVF?
I do not think so, and I say this despite having felt in
some sense coerced by the existence of reproductive
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technology. Recall, however, the nature of the dialectic of
which I spoke earlier. In suggesting that appeals to
personal experience have a role to play in moral
deliberation I was careful to say that such appeals must
themselves be subject to scrutiny. Yet, in this case, the
feeling of coercion that may arise in being presented with
our unwanted choice does not withstand critical
examination. For consider the dynamic by which the
choice comes to be seen as unwelcome and possibly
coercive. The most salient feature of this process is that
responsibility for one's childlessness appears to shift from
"nature" or "fate" to the individual. Without reproductive
technology, nothing could be done; one simply had to
accept his or her fate. In other words, there was no choice
involved. So the existence of reproductive technology does
indeed create a choice where none previously existed.
Nevertheless, it is a mistake to suppose that the existence of
the choice shifts responsibility for childlessness.
Perhaps in some circumstances unexpectedly and
reluctantly to have a choice does bring with it a degree of
responsibility, if one chooses not to act. To find oneself at
the scene of an accident at which one could easily rescue
another with little danger to oneself will certainly place one
under a burden of choosing to save. Yet even here the
language of duties, rights, or blame may be inappropriate.
In the case of choices about reproductive technology such
language will be radically out of place. In this case we are
not talking about saving lives, but possibly creating them,
and certainly with in vitro fertilization we cannot do this
easily or without risk. Indeed, even if we acknowledge the
weight of a serious commitment of individuals to attempt
to meet the needs of their partners, it does not seem to me
that someone could reasonably be blamed for choosing not
to undergo in vitro fertilization. Thus for a person to feel
that she has no choice but to undergo IVF because she
would otherwise be to blame for her childlessness is
irrational. It is the feeling that we should seek to overcome,
not the technology. I thus conclude that, once again,
concern about coercion, while legitimate, is not sufficient
to justify wholesale opposition to IVF.
Here, then, we see the dialectic to which I keep
returning. Our concrete responses to particular cases may
lead us to question our (theoretical) principles, but our
attempts to give systematic articulation to our experience
may lead us to question our experiences. Once we
acknowledge the possibility-indeed, the necessity-of
critical assessment, however, the move to incorporate
personal experience in moral deliberation no longer
appears to be the panacea suggested by LeGuin. "Offer
your experience as your truth" is indeed good moral
advice. But offering your experience is the way to begin a
conversation, not to end it. And beginning in this way does
not preclude talking objectively or fighting tenaciously.
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Magdalene
The moon's bright empty deathmask
closes its eyes at dawn,
then cracks and shatters.

I open my gate and the wind
comes along like a blind man
leaning on me, tapping
his quick, anxious cane.
We reel through narrow, crooked streets.
The city is large and ruined.
There is feeling in every part of it.
When I approach the tomb
the white shadows of my thoughts
begin to moan and whisper
like a flock of dreaming doves.
My satin cloak slides and shifts,
I lift it over my mouth.
There is the shock of music.
I raise my numb arm
to rub my burning eye.
I turn.

Rita Signorelli-Pappas
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Review Essay

CHOICES AT THE END: THINKING ABOUT
EUTHANASIA
Edward Langerak

David C. Thomasma and Glenn C. Graber, Euthanasia:
Toward an Ethical Social Policy. New York: The Continuum
Publishing Company, 1990. 302 pp. $24.95.
With Dr. Jack KeiVorkian back at assisting suicides in
Michigan, voters only narrowly defeating active euthanasia
in Washington, and Derek Humphrey's Final Exit selling
briskly everywhere, it's time for a book to help the country
move "toward an ethical social policy," which is the subtitle
and main plot of this wide-ranging book. Its best feature is
the informative way that it provides a variety of perspectives
on euthanasia. The chapter on "The Family's Perspective,"
for example, shows the sort of emotional sensitivity and
informed realism that we need for ethical social policy.
Listen:
People die in pieces. First their kidneys might go, then their
liver, then their heart, their lungs, and finally their brain. During
this process, they have invited into their bodies fluids, nutrition,
antibiotics, surgeries of various sorts, respirators, nasogastric
feeding tubes, and all sorts of other interventions. There is no
one to preside over the moment of death, since the dying is
spread out over so many moments. The physician's contact with
patient and family is episodic (and often diminishes as death
approaches). Nurses are more regularly present, but today they
have many duties that appear to be more pressing than providing
solace to the family. The family itself is diminished as a result
(86).

No wonder that "80 percent of terminally ill persons
prefer to die at home, whereas more than 80 percent of
their families prefer not to have them die there" (113) and
no wonder that we need a hospice movement to reconcile
that difference.
Edward Langerak teaches in the Department of Philosophy at St.
OlafColl£ge. He is a contributor to Christian Faith, Health and
Medical Practice, (Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1989) and author of a
widely-anthologized essay, •Abortion: Listening to the Middle. "
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Another useful feature of the book is the appendix of
56 cases, many of which convincingly illustrate points in the
main text as it makes frequent and illuminating references
to them. Included are most of the landmark euthanasia
cases (Quinlan, Herbert, Bouvia, Conroy, Dax, and
"Debbie") along with many lesser-known cases and even a
science-fiction case (267) that warns us to think twice about
lengthening the life span. The cases are well-chosen to
show the complexity of the euthanasia issue and thereby
constitute evidence for a social policy that provides both
guidance and flexibility, as well as a strong bias in favor of
family participation and authority. Sometimes the
usefulness of a case presentation is diminished somewhat
by a vanishingly thin line between description and
commentary. Consider:
Eventually, a full discussion about lack of reimbursement
led to a decision to transfer the patient, on IV pain control only,
to her home to die. She died, in fact, in transit in an ambulance.
The intention was that she would die either in transit or at home.
(277)

Since the role of intention is central to much of the
debate about euthanasia, it would be very helpful to know
whether the last sentence is meant as an empirical report
or as a commentator's inference. The authors confidently
say about this case that "since the transfer was a positive
action that was taken to implement this decision, we should
have to describe it as killing the patient" (294). However I
think one can easily describe the decision as one that did
not intend the patient's death.
The point is not trivial and bears on a very interesting
but problematic discussion that arises, not always
coherently, throughout the book. Thomasma and Graber
are sympathetic with the traditional stance of the medical
profession that physicians, while allowing death in some
instances, should not become mercy-killers. But they argue
that the traditional defense of this stance, as developed by
Paul Ramsey and others, is flawed because it insists that the
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crucial moral distinction is between merely foreseeing death
when one withholds or withdraws extraordinary treabnent,
on the one hand, and intending death when one commits
or omits certain actions in order to cause death, on the
other. The authors agree that sometimes one can act in a
way that merely allows a foreseen but unintended death, as
when one removes the respirator from a patient in an
irreversible coma. Indeed, they agree that when a physician
injects (only) enough morphine to relieve pain and
thereby hastens death, the death is foreseen but not
intended. However they argue that when one withholds,
say, penicillin, from a dying cancer patient who has caught
pneumonia, one "willfully allows" or "virtually kills" the
patient by intending to cause an earlier death by
pneumonia rather than allow a later death by cancer. And
this, they argue, is not much different from actively killing
a patient. Indeed, when death is intended because the
painful circumstances make it a friend rather than an
enemy, "not only is there no reason to believe that active
euthanasia is irredeemably wrong while passive euthanasia
is justified, but active euthanasia is actually more
meritorious than passive, everything else being equal" (80).
They reach this conclusion by noting that it is generally
better to "actively bestow" rather than "virtually bestow" a
benefit. Thus there may be instances when providing active
euthanasia is "a moral duty" (142).
Yet the authors do not advocate legalizing active
euthanasia. For one thing, if more attention is paid to
controlling suffering, there would be little need for it
(200). Moreover, we should fear the possible consequences
of such a policy, especially the slippery slope from
voluntary to nonvoluntary and even anti-voluntary
euthanasia: "when a depression hits, and the DRGs run out
even faster than they do now, or when our society
approaches overload in the coming century as gerification
continues, then will we behave any differently than the
Nazis?" (178) And if (or when? cf. 198) Washington or any
other state legalizes mercy killing, physicians should not be
the ones to do it. First, dying people retain the will to live
until the very end, and physicians should remain in the
role of providing hope (120).
Another reason is that when some physicians are
allowed to perform active euthanasia, "the moral
sentiments of society would increasingly and negatively
judge" the physicians who refuse to perform it (189). The
authors note neither that our experience with abortion
policy seems to contradict this second reason nor that it
seems to rub against the previous reason. But the authors
agree that the primary reason physicians should not kill
their patients "is not the public's perception [of
physicians], but rather inherent moral principles that are
important in resolving this problem" (149). However they
earlier rebutted the inherent principle (about not
intending death) that has traditionally been used, and the
only appeal they make on the page just quoted is to the
lack of a "social construct" for killing a friend who has
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trusted you. It is puzzling that this point is associated with
"inherent moral principles," especially when the authors
conclude this section with the quoted observation that
sometimes "he who wishes to kill you is your most precious
friend, and anyone preventing it is your worst enemy"
(149). Part of this puzzlement may be due to the authors'
confusing tendency to switch without much warning
between their own views and their paraphrases of others'
views.
In my view, the authors have not shown that, if or
when mercy killing is legalized, physicians ought not do it.
Nor have they used the best consequentialist arguments
against legalizing it. However, I do think good cases can be
made for their conclusions. For example, an analysis of the
internal goods or goals of medicine as a practice can
suggest that, although health and life cannot always be
achieved and medical practitioners must sometimes
surrender to disease and death, the latter is always an
enemy. Surrendering to an enemy because, under the
circumstances, he is the least harmful enemy, implies
neither the willingness to become a double-agent on his
behalf nor, contrary to the authors (3), that he has become
a friend. Likewise, I can allow and even welcome an enemy
to do his harm earlier and less painfully when the only
alternative is his stretching out the harm much more
painfully, but I can still refuse to contradict one of the goals
of my practice by killing when I cannot cure. Of course,
this argument requires that the goal of medicine be
something other than happiness or preference
maximization.
Agreeing that the identity and integrity of physicians
prevents their becoming mercy killers might only suggest
that society should let others (say, members of the Hemlock
Society) mercifully assist in suicide when considerations of
happiness, preferences, or autonomy call for it. Therefore,
unless the authors are wrong in denying an inherent moral
difference between passive and active euthanasia, one can
argue for a social policy that allows the former without the
latter only by citing consequentialist arguments that are
more powerful than the authors' fears about Nazism.
A recent book that does just that is Robert
Wennberg's Terminal Choices (Wm. B. Eerdman's, 1989).
Rejecting the relevance of the Nazi program, which did not
slide down a slippery slope because it started at the bottom
(219), Wennberg carefully explains a number of other
"slippery slope" and "negative fallout" arguments that most
people will find scary. For example, he plausibly worries
that having a right to be killed will translate into being
pressured to be killed and feeling guilty if one is "selfish"
enough to decline the offer (187-189). Perhaps the last
thing people on their deathbeds will feel is the oft-quoted
sentiment of Richard Lamm when he was governor of
Colorado: "Like leaves falling off a tree forming the humus
in which other plants can grow, we've got a duty to die and
get out of the way . . . so that our kids can build a
reasonable life."
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Of course, consequentialist arguments always involve
debatable empirical predictions about social changes. Can
one avoid these by refuting Thomasma's and Graber's
rebuttal of the traditional principal distinction between
passive and active euthanasia? The traditional doctrine
typically asserts that withholding or withdrawing treatments
that are medically futile or extraordinarily costly (be it
financially or in terms of pain or indignity) foresees the
earlier death only as a side-effect of a justifiable decision
about appropriate treatment; the death is not intended.
Note that the distinction is not between omission and
commission; to omit effective and inexpensive treatment is,
almost by definition, to intend the death. This was done in
those "Baby Doe" cases when parents refused to approve a
simple operation that would have saved infants with Downs
Syndrome. The authors, in one of their rare mistakes about
the history and sociology of the euthanasia debate, claim
that "virtually all the authors who discuss euthanasia give in
to this natural impulse and draw the distinction between
active and passive euthanasia on the basis of whether the
agent engages in a positive action or a negative action
(omission)" (67). But in twenty years of reading on this
issue, I have found that the vast majority of authors
recognize that it is the type of treatment, not the type of
behavior, that is morally decisive. Medical personnel may
find it psychologically easier to refrain than to perform
when death is at issue, but that fact, which may account for
the Baby Doe cases, is morally relevant only to a rather
sophisticated discussion of the social consequences of
different policies.
Hence the traditional doctrine involves a wellconsidered distinction, one that may well survive the
authors' rebuttal in which they claim that withholding, say,
penicillin, one intends to cause death by pneumonia rather
than allow death by cancer. A defender of the traditional
doctrine can reply that the patient's medical condition
involves both pneumonia and cancer, and that treating just
the pneumonia does not improve the patient's overall
medical condition. It's not diseases that are the focus of
medicine, but patients, a point that nurses sometimes
understand better than physicians. If so, it makes sense to
say that, in some conditions, a patient is medically no better
off with "mere" terminal cancer than with both cancer and
pneumonia. Interestingly, the answer to whether the
penicillin treatment is ordinary or extraordinary medical
treatment, and thereby whether death is intended or
merely foreseen, turns on the focus and goal of medical
practice.
Thus I'm not persuaded that the authors have
established their category of "virtually killing," but I do
admit that sometimes withholding or withdrawing
treatments seems to involve more than merely allowing
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death. However here, too, I think Wennberg's Terminal
Choices is clearer and more helpful. Although he notes that
merely welcoming death is not necessarily to intend it (27),
he does agree with Thomasma and Graber that diabetics
do intend death when they withhold insulin just because it
cannot cure the cancer that is painfully killing them. As
noted above, I think this claim depends on a debatable
notion of the focus and goal of medical treatment, but now
I want to notice that Wennberg does not conclude with
Thomasma and Graber that active and passive euthanasia
are in the same moral boat. Rather he sensitively and
perceptively considers Christian reasons for being
concerned about how much control one should exercise
over one's own death. One can intentionally shape one's
dying without creating it, as when a terminal cancer patient
refuses a cancer treatment that would merely prolong the
dying (151). However terminal cancer patients create their
dying when they refuse insulin, deciding to die of diabetes
rather than cancer. But, Wennberg notes, even here the
"dying patient plays the hand he has been dealt, and part
of that hand is diabetes" (153). The patient thereby "at
least leaves intact a natural death and in appropriate
circumstances does not violate the trust given by God to
faithfully preserve and protect his life" (154). The same
cannot be said of an otherwise healthy diabetic who refuses
insulin or of a diabetic, terminal cancer patient who, using
active euthanasia, creates a third cause of death. Of course,
the importance of this distinction will depend on one's
theology and therefore it may not be decisive for legal
policy in a pluralistic society. But it does provide an(other)
inherent difference between active and passive euthanasia
that will be theologically and morally persuasive to many
Cresset readers.
Thomasma's and Graber's book gives the reader the
impression that it is loosely patched together. An editor
should have reduced the number of hasty parentheses and
wordy repetitions. Unkept promises should be edited out,
such as that of a "brief critique" (3) of each option
presented in an eclectic list of types of euthanasia. Often
the discussion is more technical than precise, and even
important definitions need rewriting. For example, the
authors' own distinctions suggest that "Active euthanasia is
an intentional act that causes death (2)" should be
rewritten as "Active euthanasia is an intentional act to
cause death." But these irritating aspects of the book are
outweighed by its knowledgeable and sensitive presentation
of the personal, medical, social, and legal complexities of
the euthanasia issue. Read this book to become wellinformed; read one like Wennberg's for tighter arguments,
more attention to theology, and a more coherent
conceptual framework. 0
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PATIENT SUFFERING AND THE ANOINTING
OF THE SICK
M. Therese Lysaught
A physician, reflecting on the early days of his
medical training, recounts a relationship with a patient
suffering from a rare form of bone cancer. He recalls the
following:
In the hospital, it was the habit [of this patient] to roam the
halls late at night after his wife and small children had gone to
their lodging. I never asked him whether it was pain that kept him
moving or perhaps loneliness and a simple desire for
conversation. One night, having completed my work for the day,
feeling too tired to read on my own, and facing no other prospect
but to give in to sleep, I felt like talking.
On that night, and on other nights following, we discussed
nothing in particular. Our conversation might turn to his
aspirations at work... or to my thoughts about medicine. For a time
he would talk about his plans for the future as though they were
still foremost in his mind, but before long he would lapse into the
past tense and grow sullen. I think that a part of him was looking
for encouragement, but what little I knew of his condition made
medical reassurance nearly impossible. I hid from his pain by
focusing on the bright side of things. It was a kind of dishonesty,
though at that early point in my medical training I did not
recognize it as such. What we had was better than silence, but we
never really talked.
One night, after I had been away for several days, I met him
again in the semidark hallway near the nurses' station. He was
asking a nurse to bring something to his room ...For some reason,
she proceeded to introduce the two of us - a rare event by
hospital standards. Equally strange, neither he nor I spoke up to
say that we aleady knew one another. I put out my hand to shake
his, and he started to do the same; then it hit me: his arm was
missing. It had been amputated as part of his treatment. I should
have anticipated the amputation ... but it came as a surprise to me.
In the instant before my hand withdrew and I looked down, at a
loss for what to say or do, I caught in his eyes a look of sorrow,
perhaps even shame. I begged his pardon, but we did not speak
further ...We never met again. (Gunderman 15-16)
M. Therese Lysaught, when she has completed her dissertation at
Duke this spring, will take up a position as an Associate for Social
Policy and Culture at the Park Ridge Center for the Study of
Health, Faith, and Ethics. This is her first appearance in The
Cresset.
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A week or so later, the patient dies, and the rapidity
of the deterioration and the injustice of the illness creates a
crisis for the physician. He feels that he has failed this
patient, though not medically as this was not his patient.
He senses that he has failed morally, although according to
the principles and canons of biomedical ethics, he has
done nothing 'wrong.' The physician is disturbed that
nothing in his medical training or in his medical ethics
prepared him, guided him, instructed him in how to attend
to this man's pain and suffering.

As it did with this physician, suffering confronts us,
compels us, and condemns us. It confronts us with shock
that can upheave our unified, positive, progressive vision of
our world, our lives, and our selves. It compels us to actto alleviate it or to flee from it-in order to restore our
sense of unity shattered by its eruption into our present. It
condemns us-our fictions of unity, peace and
invulnerability, our factual selfcenteredness and complicity
in its creation and sustenance, our paralysis in its face and
our evasion of responsibility.
Suffering similarly confronts theological theory,
accusing it of being ephemeral and inadequate, assuming
the role of a problematic, a contradiction, a paradox. It
compels us to speak words that comfort and justify. It
condemns all theorizing that posits a metastructure more
important than the real and everyday or that posits a God
who could cause or allow suffering, convicting it of
complicity and generativity of conditions, of privileging an
air-tight image of God that we have created over the chaos
of those who suffer.
Suffering similarly convicts biomedical ethical theory.
In confronting biomedical ethics, the physical and social
suffering of patients rarely finds itself addressed
adequately. The reality of this suffering condemns a
biomedical ethics that privileges the construction of clean
and clear formulaic principles aimed primarily at
facilitating the decision-making of medical practitioners
and that allies itself with a theoretical structure which
cannot account for the suffering of patients - a suffering
which is the raison d'etre for medicine and the locus for
much of the moral significance of medicine. As for this
15

physician, the sufferings of patients compel us to look
beyond biomedical ethics.
This essay, then, undertakes three tasks. Part one
offers a construction of some of the philosophical
commitments of biomedical ethics, arguing that these
prevent it from adequately conceptualizing two crucial
characteristics of patients: (1) the fact that they are
suffering and (2) religious/moral interpretations patients
give to their own suffering. In order to highlight this
problem, part two describes some of the dynamics of
suffering as drawn from narratives of patients and
phenomenological analyses of suffering. Finally, part three
reflects on one way in which the Christian tradition has
incorporated these dimensions of sickness and suffering
into its corporate life, namely the Rite of the Anointing of
the Sick.
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS AND ITS THEORETICAL AI.LIANCES

Biomedical ethics failed this physician, failed to give
him the conceptual or moral tools with which to act or to
understand his lack of actions. It failed to convict his
actions as wrong, although he profoundly knew that he had
behaved badly. What do we mean by 'biomedical ethics' in
this context, and why do they often fail to provide the
necessary guidance or illumination?
Biomedical ethics might profitably be understood as a
'discourse' in the Foucauldian sense. Arthur Frank defmes
discourses as "cognitive mappings of the body's possibilities
and limitations, which bodies experience as already there
for their self understanding ... These mappings form the
normative parameters of how the body can understand
itself" (Frank 48). By situating themselves at the
intersection of a number of discourses offered by societies,
individuals formulate what Frank calls a 'code' by which we
understand, and hence navigate, both the world and our
identities. Biomedical ethics, then, insofar as it offers
societal expectations of normative ideals of individual
performance, might be understood to function in part as
an agent of social regulation.
This might seem a strange categorization for those of
us familiar with a biomedical ethic that speaks the language
of principles, rights, autonomy, and decision-making. But
the power of this description is evident in H. Tristram
Engelhardt's Foundations of Bioethics. Engelhardt is the most
articulate and forthright spokesperson for the majority
position in biomedical ethics, namely 'pluralist biomedical
ethics.' 1 Pluralist biomedical ethics see themselves as a
"general attempt at secular ethics," derived from the "logic
of pluralism," a logic which seeks to describe a neutral
framework for the peaceable resolution of controversies.
(Engelhardt 6, 11, 39)
To create this framework, pluralist biomedical ethics
utilize normative anthropological and sociological dualisms
that structure of the liberal philosophy of pluralist society.
The taken for granted dichotomies of mind/body,
reason/ desire, public/private, lead Engelhardt to make
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some bold claims. First of all, he posits the moral landscape
as bifurcated into "two tiers" mirroring traditional
distinctions between public and private. These "two tiers"
of the moral life he names the "peaceable secular
community" and "particular moral communities" (54). The
"peaceable secular community" functions as a conceptual
space in which public disputes are resolved by 'rational'
(i.e.,impartial, unprejudiced, anyonymous, universal)
arguments made by rational beings "anywhere in the
cosmos" who have transcended the boundaries of their
particular communities (10, 81, 105); ethical reasoning
and moral judgments derive authority through correlations
with procedures of this general standpoint and not from
any particular content.
While the second tier, particular moral communities,
is the locus of moral content and meaning, these
communities rely on premises that, because of their
particularity, "cannot be secured by [rational] argument,"
so that judgments of these communities cannot be
validated as "rationally" authoritative (54). Particularities
and affectivities, commitments nurtured within particular
moral communities, which for our purposes means
especially religious commitments and convictions, therefore,
cannot be admitted as premises in rational moral
arguments. While moral agents live their lives within
particular, substantial, concrete communities, for moral
purposes they must disembed themselves from these
attachments if they wish to function in the public, moral
domain.
Engelhardt also provides criteria for membership in
the 'peaceable secular community,' criteria thatare
necessary insofar as "not all humans are equal...[as he says]
persons not humans are special" (104). The criteria,
namely, rationality, self-consciousness, and a sense of
worthiness of blame and praise, define a being as an
autonomous moral agent. A body-a human body-does
not qualify one to be a moral agent; correlatively, bodies
are not theoretically required for moral agency. Bodies
tend to be practical correlatives of moral agents, but they
have no moral or rational value or content.
This distinction between 'persons' and 'humans'
greatly simplifies the task of biomedical ethics. Engelhardt
argues that there are only two methods by which to resolve
an ethical controversy: agreed-to procedures or force. The
autonomy of the members of the 'peaceable secular
community' constrains society and other persons from
using 'unconsented-to' force against them. But 'nonpersons,' who can make no claim to autonomy, are not
protected from such force.
Thus, a contradiction becomes apparent. On the one
hand, a primary object of pluralist biomedical ethics is
'bodies,' and the task is to authorize legitimate use of force
against bodies-for example, who decides what is to be
done with a particular (now incompetent) body; when do
we stop sustaining a body; when do we let new-born but
malformed bodies expire; should we kill bodies; whose
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body will have access to health care? But this same human
body does not count as a legitimate epistemological or
even anthropological moral resource. Moral subjectivity is
equated with rational mind, and 'knowledge' is available
only of those things predicated as accessible to all minds;
human embodiment, the locus of human illness and
suffering and the site of the practice of medicine, are
overlooked. 2
THE SUFFERJNGS OF PATIENTS

The patient's suffering and pain convict the
physician of moral failing.~ If biomedical ethics were to
attend to the embodied sufferings of patients, what might
they discover?
If nothing else, they would discover that the
sufferings of the sick differ widely. This fact alone renders
suffering inaccessible to biomedical ethics (See Smith 261).
Not only are different kinds of sufferings associated with
different kinds of illnesses--emergency traumatic injury vs.
chronic illness vs. terminal illness that moves rapidly vs. a
life-threatening condition that persists for twenty years vs.
illness thathas intense social stigmas--but each individual
body will be inscribed differently by the intersection of the
cultural discourses of class, race, gender, age, religion,
science and politics with the individual's personal history.
The matrix comprised of these intersections of discourses,
relationships, and histories, provides our ongoing identity,
the code by which each individual deciphers and
negotiates the world. In instances of suffering, this 'code' is
broken.
In spite of this irreducible particularity,
phenomenological and autobiographical accounts of
suffering note three consistent dynamics. In the first
dynamic, experiences of illness or pain often re-situate
patients' vis-a-vis their bodies, re-ordering taken-forgranted relationships between "self" and "body."
Experiences of illness serve as a reminder that "selves"
depend on the integrity of bodies, that health and lives are
radically contingent. In illness the body often moves from
the background to the forefront of perception, and
patients increasingly identifY their selves with their bodies,
a move which also unfortunately often encourages medical
professionals to do the same. Some describe this aspect of
patients' experiences as "essentially an ontological assault"
in which the body becomes the enemy, interposing itself
between "us and reality," standing "opposite the self,"
(Pellegrino/Thomasma 207-208) challenging a culturally
instilled sense of the transcendence of self over body.
While this reorientation can be illuminating, more
likely it can be alienating. Pain and illness can first effect
alienation by counteracting "the human being's capacity to
move out beyond the boundaries of his or her own body
into the external, sharable world" (Scarry 1~). Restrictive
and dissociative, pain "chains down our thoughts," breaks
connections between "body" and "world." In addition to
impeding motion beyond personal boundaries, pain also
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alters the nature of these boundaries: "'t is the intense
pain that destroys a person's self and world, a destruction
experienced spatially as either the contraction of the
universe down to the immediate vicinity of the body or as
the body swelling to fill the entire universe" (Scarry ~5).
The body can become one's "world" as pain occupies more
and more of one's consciousness and crowds out awareness
of anything else. Alienation can also be effected by
experiencing the body as the "enemy," the "agent of the
agony."
Secondly, patients often experience a loss or
usurpation of their "voice." Voice may literally be "lost" as
a function of pain, or legitimate "voice" may be denied or
repressed because it does not fit with normative medical or
moral language. As Elaine Scarry notes, one characteristic
of physical pain is that, for the most part, it is
"inexpressible." While I can tell you of my pain, for
example, there is no way for you to truly grasp its realityeither that it is real, or how real, how intense it is; your
doubt of my pain cannot be decisively dispelled (4). This
inexpressibility, this unsharability, can isolate patients from
those close to them and prevent them from effectively
communicating their distress to medical practitioners.
Moreover, Scarry continues, "pain does not simply resist
language, but [can] actively destroy it, bringing about an
immediate reversion to a state anterior to language, to the
sounds and cries a human being makes before language is
learned" (Scarry 4). (An alternative suggestion is that these
sounds actually are the language of pain.) It can achieve
this effect because, physical pain resists objectification.
Undoubtedly, this characteristic of pain underlies
medicine's tendency to identifY patients with their bodies:
this identification is a first step in trying to "objectifY" the
pain, to give it the referent, the object, that it lacks. As
Arthur Frank notes, illness can also result in "the loss of
capacity to express through the body" (Frank 85).
But in many ways, the medical establishment furthers
the patient's experience of loss of voice. As many have
noted, when it comes to medicine, 't he patient is a "stranger
in a strange land" (Engelhardt 256); medicine is foreign
country filled with unfamiliar languages and customs.
Kleinman, for example, perceptively comments on how
medical facilities seem designed to be navigated only by
those who are familiar with them. Often, patients' lack of
knowledge of the language of medicine can intimidate
them, leaving them speechless. When patients do "find"
their voice, they often speak of the "lived experience" of
their illness in non-scientific and often subjective
"common-sense ways accessible to all lay persons in their
social group" (Kleinman 4). But, all too often, in order to
participate in the medical cure, patients must conform
themselves to the world of medicine rather than vice versa,
learning its language; their accounts of their own illness
are translated into the language of the profession.
Kleinman notes that practitioners "have been taught
to regard with suspicion patients' illness narratives and
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causal beliefs" ( 17). Physicians often feel they have to sift
out meaning from confused and messy narratives of
patients, listening selectively "so that some aspects are
carefully listened for and heard (sometimes when they are
not spoken), while other things that are said-and even
repeated-are literally not heard" (Kleinman 52, 16; Scarry
6-7). 'Subjective' experiences of patients' illnesses become
'objective' categorized diseases. Moreover, not only are
patients' narratives at times suspect, but at times, as a result
of the "inexpressibility" of their pain, patients' claims of
illness or pain are doubted, if not explicitly denied,
especially in the cases of chronically ill patients or in cases
where the "explanatory framework" of medicine has not yet
shifted to allow an illness into "reality." (Contemporary
examples of this might include early sufferers of AIDS and
chronic fatigue syndrome.) Alternatively, patients who
reject a diagnosis of disease, or who do not conform to
acceptable modes of dealing with a diagnosis, may be
labelled as "in denial"; the physiological "interpretation" is
given higher epistemic status than the patient's lived
experiential interpretations. Patients, along with their
voices, can be rendered inadequate, unhelpful, wrong,
inactive, silenced.
But, just as a crucial characteristic of suffering is its
ability to dissolve and destroy language, a first step toward
dissolving and destroying suffering, then, is linguistic. As
pain and suffering "resist objectification in language" and
de-objectify the world, they can be only overcome by
"forcing [them] into avenues of objectification," an
objectification correlated with the body in which they
reside. (Scarry 5, 6, 17; see also Soelle 70-72) We find this
same notion of "objectification" in descriptions of "work."
Work, an inextricably social process, is the vehicle through
which we "objectify" ourselves, a multi-directional process
through which the "self" is constituted and through which
the self constitutes the "world." Dorothee Soelle em ploys
this concept to suggest that "working on" suffering is best
understood as "transforming the act of suffering into
purposeful activity ... nothing [she maintains] can be
learned from suffering unless it is worked through" (126).
A fundamental shape that this work takes in the lives
of the ill and suffering is that of creation of 'narratives.' As
Kleinman notes, "the illness narrative is a story the patient
tells, and significant others retell, to give coherence to the
distinctive events and long-term course of the suffering"
(49). Kleinman further affirms that not only does the story
reflect the experience of illness, "but rather it contributes
to the experience of symptoms and suffering" (49). Arthur
Frank confirms this process, noting that "in illness, the
body finds itself progressively unable to express itself in
conventional codes. Sometimes, with the right kind of
support, it creates a new code" (85).
It is noteworthy that Frank remarks, "with the right
kind of support." The dynamics of suffering in illness all
contribute to a sense of isolation and marginalization
voiced by many who have been ill. Consequently, this
process of narrative creation depends on the resources,
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options and opportunities offered to the individual by the
social situation. Often these prove insufficient. But
importantly, those who initiate this narrative process need
not be the victims of suffering themselves; in fact, often
they cannot be. Thus Kleinman includes as a "core clinical
task" what he calls "empathetic witnessing. That is the
existential commitment to be with the sick person and to
facilitate his or her building of an illness narrative that will
make sense of and give value to the experience" (54; see
also Scarry 6) This corporate dimension is indispensable in
the dissolution of suffering, for the sufferer to move from
the state of isolation caused by the destruction of her
world, through expression and communication to
solidarity through which change is possible. Thus, potential
for deriving meaning from suffering lies not in some
inherent quality suffering possesses, nor in the abilities of
its victims. It lies rather in the resources offered by society
and in the willingness of individuals to participate in this
process, to enter into solidarity, to pay "attention" to those
who suffer.
SUFFERING AND

IllNESS IN A liTuRGICAL FRAMEwoRK

Given the secular commitments of pluralist
biomedical ethics described in section one, the Christian
community might seem an unlikely place to tum to find
resources to aid and inform our physician. But Christian
tradition has, from its earliest beginnings, been
significantly committed to attending those who suffer. This
commitment has led to the development of practices which
in their contemporary forms attend to many of the
dynamics of suffering outlined above and thereby shape
contemporary Christian relationships to suffering, both
individual and communal. In this third section, I would
like to focus on one practice in particular- liturgical rites
of anointing and healing. For our purposes, I will draw on
the Roman Catholic tradition's Sacrament of the Anointing
of the Sick.
Before turning to the Rite, it is important to highlight
the centrality of suffering and healing in Christian practice.
Healing the sick was one of three primary activities
associated by the Evangelists with Jesus' ministry,
inextricably linked with his preaching and teaching. John
Dominic Crossan, in a recent article, attends to this fact
and suggests that Jesus' particular bodily practices (i.e.,
eating and healing) embodied his message and had radical
religiopolitical ramifications. Crossan locates his argument
within the matrix of anthropological claims that correlate
regulation of bodily boundaries with regulation of social
boundaries. Drawing on Mary Douglas, Peter Farb and
George Armelagos, as well as Pierre Bourdieu and Caroline
Walker Bynum, Crossan begins with the position that in
Jesus' Jewish culture, who one ate with defined and
identified one's location in the social matrix: "those
decisions about what we eat, where we eat, when we eat,
and above all, with whom we eat ... form a miniature map of
our social distinctions and hierarchies" (1195). It probably
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would have been rare, we can imagine, to find a Jew eating
with a Samaritan or a Pharisee with a tax collector.
Furthermore, bodies who were sick, menstruating or dead
were denoted as ritually "unclean" and would have been
categorized as those one ought not touch, let alone eat
with. Thus, food customs and illness customs provided
clear social divisions, with some designations excluding
people entirely.
Within this matrix, Crossan argues, Jesus'
proclamation of the advent of the Kingdom of God
contained a radical social challenge. Crossan maintains
that Jesus' practices and message championed a radically
egalitarian "reciprocity of open eating and open healing"
(Crossan 1195). Thus we find Jesus scandalizing on-lookers
by those he chooses to eat with (tax collectors and sinners,
taking water from a Samaritan woman). Parables tell of the
kinds of people he healed-lepers, the blind, the lame, a
woman "with a flow of blood"-those understood within
the culture to be blemished or unclean. And importantly,
in these parables it is clear that Jesus often healed by touch,
as Crossan notes:
Uesus) healed the illness by refusing to accept the official
quarantine, by refusing to stay separate from the sick person, by
touching him [or her), and thereby confronting others with a
challenge and a choice. By so doing, of course, he was making
extremely subversive claims about who defined the community,
who patrolled its boundaries, who controlled its entries and exits,
who, in other words, was in charge." (1197)
Crossan implies that these two practices--open eating
and open healing-were identifiable marks of what he calls
the 'Jesus movement." Those who had been healed were
enjoined only to carry the message, and those who carried
the message were charged to carry with them no other
provisions but to trust that message and miracle would
open the homes and hearths of those they healed. These
two practices are embodied in the contemporary Church in
the Eucharist and in the practice of ministry to the sick.
While this is not the place to argue for a stronger liturgical
and ecclesial understanding of the constitutive nature of
the latter practice, I would like to suggest that Christian
liturgies of healing, at least as represented in the Roman
Catholic Rite, are both responsive to the existential
situation of those who suffer and continue to embody the
meaning that Jesus' healing practices suggest.

As can

be seen from the text of its Introduction, the

Rite of Anointing and Pastoral Care of the Sick responds to a
number of the dynamics of the sufferings of patients noted
in part two above. First of all, the Rite is fundamentally
liturgical, reconfigured from its earlier privatized forms in
light of the Second Vatican Council call to liturgical
renewal. Properly liturgical actions embody and intend the
Church as a whole, and the Introduction to the Rite
stresses this corporate dimension:
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Like the other sacraments, these too have a communal aspect,
which should be brought out as much as possible when they are
celebrated ....The faithful should clearly understand the meaning
of the anointing of the sick so that these sacraments may nourish,
strengthen, and express faith. It is most important for the faithful
in general, and above all for the sick, to be aided by participating
in it, especially if it is to be carried out communally. ("Rite of
Anointing"191)
The communal context of the action emphasizes that,
overagainst the social and cultural realities of isolation and
marginalization that attend illness, the sick are not alone.
The ecclesial community continues to understand them as
included, and in fact, to be an integral part of the
community: "If one member suffers in the body of Christ,
which is the Church, all the members suffer with him" (I
Corinthians 12:26). ("Rite of Anointing" 190) This bond is
reinforced in the ritual actions of touch-the laying on of
hands and the anointing.
In addition to communal support being integral to
ameliorating the burdens of suffering, in part two Scarry,
Kleinman, Soelle and others further suggested the
importance of "working on" or "transforming the suffering
into purposeful activity." The Rite of Anointing of the Sick
as a liturgical act can be understood as 'work' in precisely
this sense. On the one hand this dimension can be seen
etymologically, as the Greek term 'leitourgia' is derived
from the two terms 'Ieos' (people) and 'ergou' (work).
'Liturgy' is precisely 'work' done by all the people in the
Body of Christ. Equally importantly, in the Rite, it is 'work'
done by the the sick person. The sick person is not
understood as passive and, in fact, is enjoined special
duties and activities which give meaning to their suffering:
The sick in return offer a sign to the community: In the
celebration of the sacrament they give witness to their promises at
baptism to die and be buried with Christ. They tell the
community that in their present suffering they are prepared to fill
up in their flesh what is lacking in Christ's sufferings for the
salvation of the world ... The sick are assured that their suffering is
not 'useless' but 'has meaning and value for their own salvation
and the salvation of the world' ....And the sick are believed to be
and seen as productive members of the community, contributing
to the welfare of all by associating themselves freely with Christ's
passion and death ....In the sacrament, the faith of the sick person
gives us, the healthy, a sign-an embodiment--of the words of
Paul to Timothy: 'You can depend on this: If we have died with
him, we shall also live with him. If we hold out to the end, we shall
also reign with him' (2 Tm 2:12). (Study Text, 20-21)
The sick are challenged not to isolate themselves
from the community, not to withdraw in embarrassment or
fear. They are called to continue acting as a part of the
body of Christ, called to forge ahead in the face of their
difficulties, modelling discipleship and so serving as
"minister to the whole church in their illness"(Study Text,
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41). In this way, "meaningless" suffering-of which
suffering associated with illness is especially a case-is given
a use, purpose, meaning.
Finally, we noted in part two that illness inflicts
suffering partly by breaking apart a person's "code" -that
set of discourses, relationships, and histories by which one
understands and interprets one's world and identity. The
Rite addresses this in two ways. On the one hand, most of
those to whom this Rite reaches inhabit a 'code' derived
partly from Christian formation and partly from secular
culture. In instances of illness, especially in contemporary
Western culture, part of the crisis of illness is created by
presuppositions supplied by secular culture. For example,
illness can pose a grave threat not only to psychological
identity but also to physical security in a culture that values
to the point of ideology the idea of individual autonomy.
By preaching and living the gospel of a God who is
essentially dependent and self-giving, the sacramental rite
informs those who practice it with an alternative vision of
the world.
On the other hand, as we noted above, Kleinman and
others advocate that those involved with the sick encourage
the creation of 'narratives.' While this is important, the
Church, especially through the practice of the Rite of
Anointing of the Sick, invites those who suffer to locate
their narratives in an ongoing story, tolearn anew the
stories of others who have suffered and the interpretations
they gave their experiences, to truly hear-possibly for the
first time-what it means to worship a God whose
relationship to humanity was revealed on a cross.

SACRAMENTS AND MEDICAL

Ennes?

It might be objected that all this is well and good, but
it doesn't really aid us in the difficult task of making day-today decisions about which technologies to use, and when,
and for how long. But the power of the simple dynamic
involved in these liturgical rites is easy to underestimate
when compared to the power exercised by biomedical
technologies and interventions. Like Jesus' practices of
open eating and open healing, Christian understandings of
suffering, illness and healing embodied in the rites and
liturgies of common worship challenge contemporary
cultural understandings. The Church's 'discourses'
challenge those of secular society. They refuse to locate a
creature's value solely in its rationality, refusing to accept
the designation 'enemy' for the realities of suffering and
death, refusing to validate a posture that is closed to the
world and fearful and ostracizing of those who are 'other.'
Those physicians and patients formed by ecclesial
practices of Christian communities will find themselves
navigating the world of medicine and biomedical ethics
along a different path, for what they see as 'persons,'
'threats,' 'dilemmas,' and even 'the world' may differ
signficantly from their colleagues. For the physician whose
story opened these reflections, the Sacrament of the
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Anointing of the Sick might have supplied him with
alternative understandings of sufferings and a disposition
toward openness and vulnerability that would have enabled
him to reach out to the patient with a touch that healed. As
importantly, it might have opened him to the touch of the
patient that would have left him with the hopeful memory
of shared community in addition to the empty sorrow of
aloneness. Q
Notes
1I would assert the case for three approaches to biomedical
ethics: (1) pluralist-represented by Engelhardt, and the work of
Beauchamp and Childress in Principles; (2) an ethics of
medicine-represented by Leon Kass, as well as Pellegrino and
Thomasma in A Philosophical Basis; and (3) Roman Catholic
biomedical ethics-represented by Richard A. McCormick,SJ.,
Lisa Sowle Cahill and Charles E. Curran.
2It is important to emphasize here that I am distinguishing
between medical ethics and medicine. Clearly medicine attends to
bodies and the bodily in a significant manner, both conceptually
and practically. My remarks are directed solely at medical ethics
at this poinL
3on the other hand, I do not distinguish too clearly between the
notions of 'suffering' and 'pain.' The distinction, which is
commonly employed, relates suffering to one's self and identity,
while pain is understood primarily in bodily terms. Although it is
now rather standard to make this distinction, and the distinction
can be helpful within certain arguments, I would resist making it
too clear-cut, as I am concerned that it might buy into a
mind/body dualism that will only exacerbate the problems I am
trying to address.
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Review Essay

STORIES OF ILLNESS
Thomas A. Droege
I first got interested in stories of illness when my
good friend and colleague, Professor Tom Hall of the
English Department, suggested that I read The Magic
Mountain by Thomas Mann, a fascinating account of the
romance of illness. Hans Castrop, the hero of this
narrative, has only the mildest symptoms of tuberculosis
but assumes the role of patient in a sanitorium high up on
the mountain. The mountain is a metaphor for his
spiritual struggle to transcend his sickness and his passion
for Claudia Chauchat, who is seriously ill with
consumption. "The body, love, death," he tells her, "these
three are only one. For the body is sickness and
voluptuousness, and it is this that causes death, yes, they
are carnal of both of them, love and death, and that is their
terror and their great magic!" In my judgment, The Magic
Mountain is the classic story of illness in its portrayal of the
human quest for metaphors and symbols that will bring
meaning to illness.
Heightened consciousness about the meaning of
illness is not necessarily a blessing. To regard disease as a
mystery, which Mann does so masterfully, results in the
physical disease becoming little more than a backdrop for
the meanings projected on it. The danger of using
metaphors for illness, about which Susan Sontag has
written so persuasively, is that they can be exceedingly
destructive.
In his masterful short story, "The
Metamorphosis," Franz Kafka provides a powerful
metaphor for capturing the destructive meaning that can
be projected onto catastrophic illness by the patient and
his or her family. Gregor Samsa wakes up one morning to
discover that he has turned into a giant insect. When he
tries to get up, he can't maneuver his unwieldy body, lying
on his back with six stubby legs flailing in the air.
Eventually he learns how to use his body and even enjoys
climbing walls and the ceiling. But he never gets out of the
room, treated by his family at first with disbelief and
disgust, then dutifully, then with resentment, and finally as
a foreign presence to which they owe no obligations. The
analogy between catastrophic illness and metamorphosis
may be overdrawn (my analogy, not Kafka's), but it
illustrates the destructive potential in metaphors of illness.
Susan Sontag makes that point with a much more
Tom Droege has taught for many years in the Department of
Theology at VU. His courses on Death and Dying, and in
Healing and Theology are always filled to capacity, and draw on
wide community interest. For a review of his book, The Faith
Factor in Healing, see Book Reviews in this issue.
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straightforward argument. She uses tuberculosis, cancer,
and AIDS as examples of the destructive consequences of
giving metaphorical meaning to illness, a meaning that she
contends is invariably moralistic. Because of the mystery
associated with each of these diseases, people project
meanings onto the diseases with stereotypes and condemn
the victims with suffering beyond the physical burden
which the disease brings. Sontag, herself a victim of
cancer, shows how the negative images of cancer add to the
suffering of those who have it. While tuberculosis often
enhanced the identity of those who had it (Castrop in
Magic Mountain), cancer is regarded with irrational
revulsion . It is perceived as dark and menacing, selfdestructive, generated by one's own cells and related to
self-hate. AIDS has generated metaphoric meanings that
are even harsher and more judgmental than those
associated with cancer.
Sontag draws the following conclusion from her study
of illness as a metaphor: "My point is that illness is not a
metaphor, and that the most truthful way of regarding
illness-and the healthiest way of being ill-is one most
purified of, most resistant to, metaphoric thinking" (fllness
as Metaphor 24). Sontag is right in warning against the evil
of destructive metaphors but wrong in her contention that
we either can or should eliminate metaphors completely.
We cannot help giving disease a meaning. Metaphors,
images, and stories can be used in both constructive and
destructive ways. What we need are metaphors and
meaning maps that alleviate suffering rather than
contribute to it, and we have the resources to do that
through the stories we tell.
Two widely-differing examples that show the need
for finding meaning in illness are the illness narratives of
John Donne and Cornelius Ryan. Donne's Devotions Upon
Emergent Occasions conforms to a seventeenth century
experience of serious illness, which meant that one took to
bed, waited for the disease to reach its climax, endured the
critical days, and patiently endured a lengthy period of
convalescence. The inevitable passivity is something the
patient was expected to accept in the spirit that he or she
accepted the disease, as the will of God. This stands in
striking contrast to Cornelius Ryan in A Private Battle, where
the model is the war hero who fights valiantly to the end
against great odds.
Donne sees a close connection between the travail of
the body and the travail of the soul, and Ryan between
illness and war. For Donne religion provides a uniform
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model that explains the meaning of illness and the way to
experience it. Ryan uses the metaphor of battle to
understand the meaning of cancer, perceived by him and
many in our culture as an alien intruder and silent
destroyer. For Donne everything that happens to his body
in the course of his illness has a counterpart in the life of
his soul. His is a sacramental view of illness and healing.
For Ryan illness has no meaning other than that of evilcancer with the face of a mass murderer.
Ryan, a journalist and historian of World War II,
became ill with cancer while he was researching and
writing A Bridge TooFar, an epic account of a famous battle
toward the end of the war. His story, as told by himself and
his wife in A Private Battle, is full of stoic courage as he
fought to complete this project. As one might suspect,
Sontag objects to a military metaphor for cancer. "We are
not being invaded," she insists, "the body is not a battle
field. The ill are neither unavoidable casualties nor the
enemy" (95). Donne uses Christian metaphors and images
to find meaning and comfort in his illness, over which he
had no more control than Ryan. Here again, the problem
is not that we construct stories of illness that rely heavily on
metaphor and analogy, but that we construct stories which
hurt instead of heal. I would contend that the stories of
both Ryan and Donne show the human capacity to
transcend illness with the aid of metaphor and myth.
If the goal is to eliminate all metaphor from an
interpretation of illness, then medical science comes as
close as you can get. The mechanistic model that has
dominated the modern medical approach to healing has
all but eliminated subjectivity as having anything to do
with either the cause or the cure of illness. The
identification of the medical profession with impersonal
objectivity has become so complete that physicians have
become one of our favorite scapegoats for the hostility that
people generally feel toward the incursions of technology
into the sphere of our personal and communal lives.
That is changing, though it may not have been
obvious to you if you've recently been a patient in a
hospital or visited your doctor's office. To be aware of the
changes, you need to look at the reform movements of
holistic, behavioral, and environmental medicine. Changes
are also evident in thousands of research studies that have
been done in the last ten years on the interface between
mind and body, studies that have already spawned a new
branch of medicine called psychoneuroimmunology.
Though more subtle, changes can also be seen in the
attention being given to the ancient art of medicine, which
at one time was as highly regarded as the science of
medicine.
. In the category of the art of medicine, a genre of
literature is being spawned by a core group of medical
authors interested in stories of illness. These authors are in
the unique position of being participants in the stories of
iiiness which they report. What is unusual about them is
their interest in the larger story of illness as a source of
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information for both the cause and cure of illness.
Physicians have always been interested in what people
report about their illness, but that interest was limited to
the case history. It's the facts that are important in a case
history-what hurts, where, when it started, how long it
lasts, what precipitated it. That narrow focus is being
broadened by this core group of medical authors to
include the narrative structure of illness and the meaning it
holds.
The clinical biographies in Oliver Sacks' Awakenings
are good examples of how a narrative structure can give
meaning to illness. Technical scientific language is used to
describe the organic malfunctions, but these technical
descriptions are set within narrative accounts that reveal
the personal meaning of illness and the variety of ways that
individuals cope with the changes that any experience of
illness brings. Sacks tells the stories of truly remarkable
recoveries of patients who had been affiicted with extreme
forms of Parkinsonism. Treated with L-DOPA, a new
wonder drug in the 60s, many of these patients who had
been locked inside their bodies for over twenty yearsseverely limited in speech and mobility-regained full
function of their physical powers within days, only to lose it
again within days.
Sacks, a neurologist, has written several books of
clinical biographies, including an autobiography on the
self-disruption he experienced after suffering extensive
nerve damage in his leg as a result of a fall. Entitled A Leg
to Stand On, the book contains Sacks' report that he lost
any sense that his leg was attatched to his body. More than
a functional disturbance that comes with a feeling of
numbness or inability to move the leg, this experience was
nothing less than an "ontological assault" affecting his very
being as an integrated whole.
Sacks has become a kind of poet laureate of
contemporary medicine. He has a genius for entering into
the patient's illness and seeing how the sick person copes,
how he or she can live through the disability. For
example, he speaks of the recovery of the use of his leg:
"Now, so to speak, I was musicked along. I did not contrive
this. It happened to me." Remembered music gave him
the rhythm to walk, whereas before there was no way to
"will" the movement of his leg.
Do physicians have to get sick or have an accident, as
did Sacks, in order to be sensitized to the meaning of
illness from the perspective of the patient? That's the
impression one gets from the recent movie, Doctor, based
on a book written by a physician who was oblivious to the
meaning of illness throughout his medical career until he
himself became ill close to the age of retirement. Such a
dramatic reversal of roles may be needed in some cases,
but surely the better way is to assist physicians to be better
listeners, more aware of how illness fits into the story of the
patient's life.
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I can think of no better place to begin than reflecting
with Arthur Frank on how one incorporates the
experience of illness into the story of one's life. Arthur
Frank experienced two life-threatening illnesses within a
year, a heart attack at age 39 and cancer at age 40, and his
recent book, At The WUZ of The Body, is the story of how he
wove those experiences into the fabric of the meaning of
his life. It's the best real-life story of illness that I have
read. One of many things that make this book so valuable,
beyond the sheer fascination of a story told wonderfully
well, is the insight it provides on the differences of
experience and meaning between a heart attack and
cancer, the two greatest killers in our time. Frank describes
his heart attack as an incident from which he could bounce
back. His cancer, on the other hand, drew him into a
world of isolation and incoherence. For him cancer was
"something to recover from if you can, but recovery is
worth only as much as what you learn about the life you are
recovering." It's the recovery of meaning that he is talking
about; that's what the struggle with illness is all about.
Another basic distinction that runs throughout the
book is between disease (the medical focus) and illness
(the patient's experience). "In disease talk my body, my
ongoing experience of being alive, becomes the body, an
object to be measured and thus objectified .... Patients
quickly learn to express themselves in those terms, but in
using medical expressions ill persons lose themselves: the
body I experience cannot be reduced to the body someone
else measures."
Frank's book is full of such wisdoms that can be
gained only from within the experience of illness, and I
heartily recommend it for those who are ill and those who
will become ill, which is the rest of us. But I recommend it
especially to health care professionals for the light it sheds
on the story of illness and its importance for healing and
wholeness.
Howard Brody, whose book Stories of Siclr.ness
presents the best argument for why his colleagues should
listen to people like Frank more than they do, says that "we
are, in an important sense, the stories of our lives. How sickness
affects us depends on how sickness alters those stories. Both sick
persons and physicians make the experience of sickness more
meaningful (thereby reducing suffering) by placing it within the
context of a meaningful story ... Every medical history should
include a description of what the illness means to the patientwhat the patient thinks has caused it, what he thinks will happen
to him in the future as a result, and what he thinks the best
treatment ought to be" (185£). And again, "It may be reasonably
hypothesized that the placebo effect, well known to be ubiquitous
in medicine, works precisely by way of this meaning route-a
story that makes sense, implies enhanced social support and
caring, and tends to lead toward mastery and control of the illness
will maximize the perceived (and objective) relief of the sickness
episode" (185).
Brody would like to see physicians who are trained to
"attend carefully to the stories their patients tell them and
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engage them in meaningful conversation, within the
broader context of the range of life stories made available
to all of us by our society and our culture" ( 182). This
includes religious stories, of course, which are especially
important for persons facing chronic or terminal illness,
for which medical science generally has treatment that is
only palliative.
Finally, Living With Chronic Illness, by Stephen A.
Schmidt, is a book about the religious stories of people
who are living with chronic illness. Schmidt weaves the
Christian story into the telling of his own story of learning
to live with a chronic illness. The same pattern is evident
in the other stories that Schmidt tells about chronically ill
persons who have participated with him in an ongoing
support group sponsored by a Lutheran congregation.
Though suffering can embitter those who are touched by
it, in most cases suffering serves as a catalyst in
transforming persons who are ill into powerful witnesses to
the meaning of life. Students in a course I teach on
"Spiritual Needs and Health Care" have as one of their
assignments an extended interview with someone who is
chronically ill or disabled. They consistently come back
with stories that reflect the transformative potential of
suffering when it comes to people who have big enough
stories to make sense out of illness and disabilities that are
often of tragic proportions. Stories of illness reveal what
Herbert Benson calls the faith factor in healing, when faith
is understood as that which brings meaning to life and
healing is understood as something broader than physical
cure. 0
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House Calls
James Combs
There is a much reprinted
painting with which many older
Americans who have sat in
doctors'waiting rooms are familiar .
The setting is a nineteenth-century
farmhouse lit only by an oil lamp. A
sick child lies on chairs pushed
together, while the distraught parents
keep vigil in the shadows. In the light
is the doctor, sitting in a chair, leaning
forward, hand on bearded chin,
looking intently at the child. His
trademark, the doctor's black leather
bag, is on the table. It is deep into the
night, the child is seriously ill, and the
kindly country doctor is intent on
effecting a cure, willing to stay until
health is restored. The child's life is in
the hands of someone committed to
the highest principles of the
Hippocratic Oath. This popular
picture is sentimentally wrenching, but
it did convey to previous generations
the esteem, and trust, in which
medical doctors were held. American
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popular mythology in the previous
century developed an array of
stereotypical social roles, roles that
subsequently were to be celebrated in
the mass-produced popular culture of
our century.
The kindly but wise, often worldweary, doctor of the frontier, the
yeoman heartland, the small town, or
city neighborhood has been a staple of
our nostalgic image of the past. Think
of the crusty but benign doctors of
popular knowledge-the alcoholic and
eloquent Doc Boone of the film
Stagecoach, the stalwart Doc Adams of
Gunsmoke, the grouchy but dedicated
Dr. Gillespie of the Dr. Kildare movies
and television series, the altruistic
doctor who did good deeds
anonymously in Magnificent Obsession,
the courageous and shrewd rural Dr.
Christian, The Last Angry Man,
doggedly practicing family medicine in
an urban slum.
The doctor in that nineteenthcentury painting that adorned so many
wa1t1ng rooms was a private
practitioner. The picture was often
distributed to doctors by medical
supply firms, and clearly was subtle
American Medical Association
propaganda supporting the essentially
private nature of medical practice, the
integrity and commitment of the
doctor, his rootedness in the
community, and the inviolability of the
"doctor-patient relationship." This is
all symbolized by the fact that in the
picture the doctor is making a house
call, and a late one at that. The doctor
was the social agent of health and
healing, the bringer and saver of life,
the man who delivered babies, cured
children, eased aches and pains, set
and stitched and soothed our pained
bodies, held our hands during death
watch, was an indispensable and
respected member of the local
community.
He was a master of amateur
psychology, prescribing placebos to
hypochondriacs, for instance. A
shrewd and compassionate observer of
human society, he knew all the town
secrets-the botched abortion the
banker's daughter had in the city, how
much the minister drank, who was the

father of the racially-mixed child he
delivered, the bouts of insanity that
bedeviled the mayor's wife. He was not
a rich man for there were too many
unpaid bills from farmers whose crops
had failed, poor patients that he saw
for free, and loans to send a bright
young man who dreamed of becoming
a doctor to college. His willingness to
make house calls gave him a purview
on his locale that no other community
figure enjoyed. The doctor was our
intimate, our confidante, our healer,
the one person in town in whom we
could have confidence, who would be
admitted at once to our homes
anytime day or night when something
was wrong, and on whose discretion
and judgment we could rely.
This is clearly a lot of
mythological baggage for any one
social role to carry, and in recent
decades the image of the kindly
country doctor has become archaic. As
Todd Wider explains in the Journal of
Popular Film and TV (Winter 1990), in
the many doctor movies of the 1930s
the kindly country doctor figure
retained the therapeutic and caring
values in urban, and usually hospital,
settings. The medical research
scientist, the European-accented
specialist,
even
the
medical
bureaucracy of the hospital or city
medical association may have had
highfalutin' ideas about research and
wntmg learned textbooks and
orthodox procedure, but the
transplanted country doc clung to his
simple notions about curing his
patients. The modern "true physician"
may be more sophisticated, up-to-date
on medical innovations, perhaps even
somewhat more well-heeled, but he
embodied the popular notion of what
a "good doctor" was supposed to be. As
Wider notes, during the 1930s, in the
spirit of the New Deal, although he
was careful to not give up his private
status, he was also something of an
it in eran t public health official,
warning the town to clear slums in
order to prevent the spread of disease.
Since the 1930s, the medical
story and the doctor as an identifiable
and widely believable social hero
persisted until just lately as a staple of
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popular melodrama. For the
layperson, what doctors do is both
mysterious and vital, and since we all
have an emotional-not to mention
physical-stake in their success, there
is something uniquely satisfying about
fictional depictions of their triumphs.
Conversely, one cannot imagine
audiences enjoying a steady fare of
tales of medical failures! The tendency
was to portray doctors as deeply
committed to the healing art, and
intensely interested in the health of
the patient. What did begin to change,
however, was the locale of the doctor's
dramatic work. The kindly country
doctor virtually disappeared, even,
surprisingly, on television shows like
Andy Griffith, Green Acres, and The
Waltons. Older doctors became
professional but fatherly mentors for
younger doctors in large hospital
settings. Remember, for example, the
more urbane if equally dedicated Dr.
Gillespie and young Dr. Kildare in the
1960s series; Dr. Zorba and Ben Casey;
and others, such as the James Daley
and Chad Everett characters on
Medical Center. On the soap operas,
such as the original General Hospital,
The Doctors, and Young Doctor Malone,
hierarchies of hospital-affiliated
doctors and nurses, sometimes
specialists, would deal with the drama
of an astonishing array of diseases.
Even if the values of the old-time
private practitioner were still there,
the setting was now urban and
organizational. The doctor of our
dreams was now a professional in the
modern
sense-credentialled,
specialized,
bureaucratized,
technologically
adept,
groupaffiliated-in short, an Organization
Man or Woman. These latter-day
doctors appealed to an evolving
tension in the popular mind. Since we
desired to believe in both the personal
commitment and professional efficacy
of doctors, these modern doctors had
to display a balance between old and
new virtues, making the individual
patient's health his or her personal
concern but now armed with all of the
organizational and technological
power available in the big city hospital.
When writers in the late sixties
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and early seventies adapted the doctor
formula to incorporate changing
developments in the practice of
medicine, some interesting variants of
the doctor story evolved. The soaps
introduced women in primary roles as
doctors. The medical technicians of
Emergency demonstrated that the latest
state of the art medical technology
could be brought to a car accident or
house fire near you. In an attempt to
blend the doctor story with the
detective formula, the television series
Quincy featured Jack Klugman as a
crusading pathologist who solved
crimes. And, in the movie Change of
Habit, Elvis played an inner-city Tom
Dooley, a doctor who benevolently
dispensed medical care to orphans
and other neglected children. (Dr.
Elvis belonged to the branch of the
medical profession that believed if
medical science lacked a remedy for
his patients' ills, a doctor could always
sing to them.)
Perhaps most interesting of all
the variants was the long-running TV
success, Robert Young's Marcus Wellry,
M.D. Welby, recall, was an older and
wiser doctor who mentored his young
associate played by James Brolin in
their Los Angeles practice. Yet, he
practiced in a homey-looking office
and gladly made house calls! He
became involved not only with the
illnesses, but also the lives, of his
patients, who tended to have an exotic
"disease of the week" that he would
successfully treat, healing both their
bodies and their relationships with his
medical expertise and his wisdom
about human nature. Welby was a
descendant of the kindly country
doctor, only now making house calls
off the Los Angeles freeway. He was
still a "general practitioner," engaged
in primary relations with his patients,
but conversant with a breath-taking
array of ailments and treatments, a
combination of the out-of-date and the
up-to-date.
But since Welby, the popular
image of the doctor has become
increasingly confused. The Welby
premise was a bit incredible, and our
memory of local doctors who actually
did make house calls lost through

generational passage. I suspect that for
most people in the last two decades,
their experience with doctors, and the
medical system as a whole, makes
popular depictions of a primal and
warm "doctor/patient relationship"
more difficult There was a time when
people would have the same doctor
most of their lives, and if ill, the same
doctor would treat a disease from
diagnosis to cure. Now people see
rotating doctors in medical groups,
are referred to different specialists,
deal more and more with nurses and
medical technicians, wind their way
through the organizational maze of
the hospital or clinic, and talk to a
doctor for only a very brief
consultation. An ever-increasing
number of people never sees a doctor
at all. Doctors have become part of the
organizational revolution of advanced
modern society, with all of the
technological and medical knowledge
that can be mustered at their disposal.
For many laypeople, doctors are
now remote figures, technocrats who
have only a professional interest in
their illness and who do not care
whether we live or die. I do not mean
to suggest that is a universal attitude
nor that doctors are no longer
committed to their oath, only that the
"organizational imperative" of
modernity has made them part of a
system that reinforces secondary
relationships with their clients, making
the latter feel that the profession is
uncaring. Perhaps there still is in us a
nostalgic urge for the warmth and
understanding of the kindly country
doctor of yore, a feeling that for all the
advances in medicine the practice of
that science has in the process lost its
art.
Even though the medical
community and our relationship to it
may have changed, popular culture in
the last twenty years has largely resisted
the temptation to tum doctors from
heroes to villains. In the movie The
Hospital (1971), a large urban hospital
is the scene of fran tic and shocking
events that undermine one's faith in
the hospital system, but the bitterly
discouraged doctor of the story
becomes something of an existential
The Cresset

anti-hero, practicing medicine in spite
of insane conditions. In M*A *S*H,
both movie and TV series, the doctors
cope with the insanity of war,
attempting to save lives that someone
else just tried to take. And this is
typical: the doctor is still a hero, but
not the system. Indeed, in the
frightening film Coma (1978),
someone higher up in an urban
hospital is killing and stealing patients
from a big-city hospital, which
responsible
but alienated Dr.
Genevieve Bujold discovers and
exposes. And, in the many horrorsplatter films that use hospital settings,
the medical system produces gore,
butchery, and corpses. (There are
horrific successors in modern hospitals
to Viktor Frankenstein, who, you will
recall, was a medical doctor fooling
around with Mother Nature.)
On soap operas, there are still
plenty of doctors, but the fact that they
are physicians is now more incidental
to other plot lines: General Hospital has
long since ceased to center on medical
problems, and doctors are more
concerned with sexual rather than
patient relations. A glance at your
television guide will alert you to the
astonishing fact that doctors have
almost totally disappeared from primetime TV. There are still cops, private
eyes, lawyers, and dysfunctional
families, but virtually no doctors.
There is Doogie Howser, M.D., the series
about the pre-teen genius who
becomes a doctor, but that is more
about maturation than medicine. Bill
Cosby is a doctor, with his practice in
his house, but he is rarely seen
practicing medicine; one suspects such
a status was accorded him as part of
the array of symbols that establish the
Huxtables as a solid African-American
family. St. Elsewhere was just about the
last series dealing with medicine, and
that utilized the Hill Street Blues
formula, making it more about an
array of characters variously coping
with contemporary urban life than
with the challenges and choices of
medical practice. Now the longest
running show on TV about a doctor,
currently in syndication, is James
Herriott's All Creatures Great and Smal~
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about a veterinarian in rural England
in the rustic past, another kindly
country doctor. We may only wonder
why.
The purveyors of popular culture
are sensitive to paten tial audience
sentiments and moods, which for the
moment does not seem to include
heroic, or even very positive, portrayal
of doctors at work. Doctors still enjoy a
great deal of social prestige and
deference, still practice an everadvancing and vital skill, and are
involved literally in quite dramatic lifeand-death situations. But one wonders
if this reluctance to depict doctors has
something to do with the state not of
the profession but of the system.
Doctors may be respected as a
profession, but for more and more
people the medical system is indeed
becoming a nightmare. Ironically, as
the depth and breadth of medical
science becomes all the more
encompassing in what it can do for
sick people, it may also become the
case that fewer and fewer people will
have access to it. If the costs and
availability of medicine become more
and more exclusive, then both popular
attitudes and our responding popular
culture might try something new:
blame the doctors. In that event,
doctors will just join the ranks of other
professions which have become
suspect in recent years-lawyers,
bankers and investors, politicians, and
corporate
executives.
As
organizational and political failures
compound the decline in our quality
of life, it is common to put a face, and
a profession on it, making the culprits
who run the systems into people who
are venal, exploitative, greedy, and
incompetent. The various systemic
breakdowns that we are witnessing in
the 1990s--banking, retirement and
security, justice and the law, corporate
stability, government entitlements and
services--will likely be complemented
by the atrophy of available and
affordable medical services for
significant segments of the population.
There are, for instance, fewer
and fewer country doctors, kindly or
otherwise; more and more rural areas
and small towns simply have no

doctors, and cannot lure one there.
For people who live in such places,
doctors may come to be seen as
remote, forbidding, uncaring, and
mercenary, so they might well respond
to popular portrayals that validate
their bitter experiences. The same will
be true of inner-city dwellers wherein
there are no more charity hospitals,
and thus no one in the system that is
seen as charitable, especially those
ostensibly sworn to healing the sick
and not just those who can afford to
be sick. If negative images of doctors
become popular, the profession had
better try to reform its image
through expressions of concern.
Perhaps they could start making house
calls again.
It is common when there is
ambivalence in a present about
something or someone for popular
culture to avoid it, or to place
treatment of it in a past or future. The
kindly country doctor may have
disappeared from depictions of our
past, and is held in abeyance in the
present, but there is one popular
depiction of a kind yet organizationally
and technologically sophisticated
doctor currently on TV that is
projected into the future. I refer to Dr.
Beverly Crusher of the Starship
Enterprise in the widely syndicated
Star Trek: The Next Generation. The new
Star Trek is remarkable televison,
carrying Gene Roddenberry's futuristic
myth into the 1990s. And one of the
most remarkable things about it is
three innovative female characters
who are each engaged in different
aspects of healing. Dr. Crusher, Chief
Medical Officer, attends to physical
injuries and diseases; Deanna Troi,
Ship's Counselor, directs her
telepathic, intuitive powers toward
unraveling psychological problems;
and Guinan, Ship's Bartender, played
by Whoopi Goldberg, uses her mystic
powers for spiritual insight and
reconciliation.
Dr. Crusher is a part of the warm,
extended family of the crew. She is a
mother whose son serves on the ship,
an officer of Star Fleet, and a
dedicated physician responsible for
the health of the galactically-diverse
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crew. She brings some nice feminine
values to the profession, including
care and nurturing, insistence on
observing healthful practices and
precautions,
and
a
certain
resourcefulness. But she is also
extraordinarily competent, with the
state-of-the-art medicine of the twentythird century. She is unconcerned
about money, professional prestige,
and other sordid twentieth-century
evils. And, she makes house calls, as it
were, all over the ship, or wherever
needed. Any patient could have
complete confidence in her personal
commitment to their well-being and in
her professional competence to try to
bring that about.
A popular icon such as Dr.
Beverly Crusher reminds us just how
much hope we invest in the "helping
professions." For the contemporary
layperson, professions, as G.B. Shaw
acidly remarked, are coming to be
seen as conspiracies against the laity,
but that is clearly not the way we would
wish it to be. For professionals of
various sorts-police and judges,
lawyers, politicians, professors, bankers
and business executives, and most of
all doctors--are supposed to help and
not hurt us. But hope that such help
will be forthcoming is a social
commodity in short supply in 1992.
The kindly country doctor of
nostalgic memory may have faded, but
not the faint hope of rekindling
somehow the virtues he represented
and which we have now lost. If hope
for such a "re-personalized" medicine
is absent in the present, then it can
only be projected into a mythical
future.
A Dr. Beverly Crusher
becomes in the late twentieth century
a popular symbol of hope, since we
hope
against
doubt
that
somehow the professional and
specifically medical corruptions and
failings of the present will someday be
overcome. The kindly country doctor
pondering that sick child by lamplight
once gave us hope of an even chance
against death, not only because of
what he knew but also because we
believed he cared. Cl
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William F. May, The Patient's Ordeal,
Bloomington and Indianapolis:
Indiana University Press, 1991. 224
pgs., $24.95.
Serious philosophical and
theological attention to moral issues of
medicine can be dated as having
begun, roughly, in the mid-nineteen
fifties with the publication of Joseph
Fletcher's Morals and Medicine. It was
only some fifteen years later, about the
time of the publication of Paul
Ramsey's The Patient as Person, that the
sub-discipline of biomedical ethics
became a "growth field." Courses in
medical ethics are now common in
colleges and universities across the
nation; there are a number of medical
ethics think-tanks and several major
journals in the field and more than a
few graduate programs which offer a
specialization, if not a complete
program, in medical ethics.
There are many revealing
generalizations one could make about
the scholarly discussions in medical
ethics these thirty-odd years, but two
things stand out in my mind. Debates
in medical ethics-both theological
and philosophical-have, for the most
part, followed the approach and the
lines of moral debate established by
Joseph Fletcher and Paul Ramsey.
That is to say, medical ethics has been
thought of as a problem-solving
discipline. The practice of modern
medicine raises for us a moral

quandary, say, should we withhold
food and drink from someone who is
dying but is not yet dead? The
discipline of medical ethics enables
one to better understand the problem
and all its moral ramifications and
provides one with a resolution of the
problem. One might, following
Fletcher, appeal to the consequences
of a proposed action to determine its
goodness; or one might, following
Ramsey, try to determine whether the
proposed action is compatible with the
sort of respect owed to a person, the
consequences be hanged. In any case,
creativity in medical ethics has
consisted of novel twists of
interpretation and surprising solutions
to one of the standard problems
already identified by medical ethicists
or in the identification of some
previously un- or under-considered
moral problem of medicine. The work
of the medical ethicist has been to aid
in the discovery of a solution to some
significant moral problem of
medicine, a problem which, when the
time came, could be resolved and
disposed of. Medical ethicists have
been, by and large, problem-solvers,
the moral expert one could turn to
upon confronting a trying moral
problem.
The second characteristic of this
period of medical ethics is that
ethicists have, for the most part,
addressed the problems that confront
not the patient, but the medical
practitioners-physicians, nurses,
health-care administrators, etc. The
agenda for the medical ethicists has
been set by the health-care profession,
by those who provide care rather than
by those who receive it. This is quite
understandable. Health-care workers
are generally better educated and
more articulate than their patients
and, thus, might more easily anticipate
moral problems of medicine
(although the problems they
anticipate may not be those which the
patient would most readily identify).
Furthermore, health-care workers have
professional obligations, not to
mention social and economic
interests, to address moral issues of the
profession.
The Crtsset

The writings of two individuals
stand out as notable exceptions to
these generalizations about the
dominant discourse of medical ethics.
One of these is Stanley Hauerwas,
whose Naming the Silences is also
reviewed in this issue of The Cresset.
Hauerwas has colorfully painted an
approach to ethics clearly distinct from
the reduction of ethics to moral
problem-solving. For Hauerwas, moral
character is the object of ethics and
narrative the canvas of the moral life.
The other individual whose
writings stand out is William F. May,
Carey M. Maguire Professor of Ethics
at Southern Methodist University and
author of The Physician's Covenant :
Images of the Healer in Medical Ethics
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press,
1984).
That May has been an
influential exception to the rule in
medical ethics is documented in an
article published by the most
prominent of medical ethics thinktanks, the Hastings Center, in its
fifteenth anniversary issue in 1986.
Out of six individuals who were asked
to review the fifteen year history of the
Hastings Center Report and identify
what articles had made a difference to
their own thinking or to the discipline
of biomedical ethics, essays by William
F. May were the most frequently
mentioned.
Gilbert Meilaender is not
mistaken in his explanation of May's
influence: "[May] is a master of the
provocative, insightful essay-always
packaged in alluring prose of a sort
one gets to read all too seldom." May
is a superlative writer, to be sure. But
what distinguishes May, above all, is
what Aristotle identified as phronesis,
moral wisdom. I know of no other
writer in medical ethics who I so
depend upon to observe and mark the
hard-to-see moral properties of the
issue at hand, the aspects of an issue
that elude my gaze. In The Patient's
Ordea~ May remains true to character.
The concern that drives this work
is the question of how we, as patients,
should confront events and medical
treatment that assault our identities,
that threaten our understandings of
who and how we will be. How do we
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live in the presence of the health-care
crises that will not go away? May's eye
is turned upon the burned, the
retarded, the gestated and sold, the
battered, the molested, the aged, and
the afflicted assisting the afflicted.
The book's first chapter
exemplifies the work as a whole. May
examines the case of Donald (Dax)
Cowart, a young man from Texas
severely burned in an automobile
explosion. Donald Cowart survived
the explosion that killed his father,
survived the horrified "0 my God!" of
the farmer who discovered his charred
body. He survived the daily tubbings
and the pain of medical treatment that
further assaulted him despite his
repeated protests. Donald Cowart
survived "the psychic wound of
mutilation," his deformed appearance
as he re-entered the everyday life of
the normal. And yet, he did not
survive, as he expressed to the farmer
who found him, "Don't you see, I am a
dead man. I can't live." Donald
Cowart died in that explosion and was
painfully reborn as Dax Cowart. And
now, every minute of every day of the
rest of his life Dax Cowart will live as
the man who both is and is not Donald
Cowart.
How should we think about the
lives of the Donald Cowarts? What
should and should not have been
discussed in considering the medical
treatment provided him? Ordinarily
the discussion has been framed in
terms of life vs. quality of life-If we
can save the patient's life will she then
have a life worth living? May proposes
a shift in our thinking from life vs.
quality of life to "life/ death/rebirth."
"Diminished quality of life" does not
capture the catastrophe that has
befallen Dax Cowart. It is life vs.
quality of life thinking that is behind
our penurious rehabilitative and
chronic care spending as compared to
our relative extravagance in acute,
emergency care spending. "His life
was worth saving, so we saved him. He
lives. Next crisis ... " "Life/death/
rebirth" more clearly suggests to us
that acute care is only the beginning of
the ordeal through which a good
community will accompany the

patient. And "life/death/rebirth"
reminds us that it is the patient, and
not the health-care workers, who is the
central figure of this ordeal.
Dax Cowart's physicians refused
to heed his protests against medical
treatment. Too ready are physicians to
preserve life because it is within their
power and expertise. But too ready
too, May argues, are the antipaternalists who valorize any decision a
patient may make, in recognition of
the patient's autonomy. The refusal to
offer moral criticism, even out of
respect for another's autonomy, is an
abandonment of care. Although
patients do have a moral right to
refuse treatment, there is no moral
right of freedom from moral criticism.
"A liberty merely patronized is a moral
being denied."
May eloquently concludes his
discussion of Dax Cowart::
"One may criticize such a person
(one ought not to blink at his faults), but
one cannot rightly patronize him. Should
he choose to live, he cannot simply choose
to take up his old life. He must become a
new man. Don Cowart becomes Dax. No
parentalist can force him down that road.
To travel into that darkness requires an
interior transformation, it requires ethics
at the deepest level, not trivial problemsolving, but the reordering of one's
identity from the ground up. The
community can and must assist in countless
ways.
But without consent to
transformation the patient cannot move
from saying "please let me die" to "I am
glad to be alive. • That heroic movement
does not vindicate his doctors, because the
deeper decision must be his, and only as it
is his do we see in him not simply a patient
encased and obscured by the surgeon's art
but the uncanny radiance of a man," (35).
May leads us to the new parents
who must rethink themselves as
parents as they hear the cries of their
impaired newborn. He walks us
through Caswell Center for the
Retarded in Kinston, N.C. He thinks
with us about the making of babies,
the tempo and atmosphere of the life
of the battered woman, the therapy of
forgiveness in the life of the sexually
abused. He sits us beside the aged and
cautions us about the vices of old age
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while reminding us of the virtues that
can be and should be present in the
lives of the elderly.
Aristotle recommended that his
students try to think like the person of
practical wisdom, that they try to see
things and make their moral decisions
the way they think a morally wise
person would. Those who would think
morally about medicine are unlikely to
find a better guide than William F.
May, as The Patient's Ordeal so
splendidly reveals. This is, to my
mind, ethics at its deepest level.
Thomas D. Kennedy

Thomas A. Droege, The Faith Factor in
Healing, Philadelphia: Trinity Press,
1991. 117 pp., $14.95
For centuries the "boundary
between care of the soul and care of
the body has been clearly defined ... "
The medical world's sphere of
influence has been the care of the
body, viewed as a machine to be
repaired and kept in good working
order. The religious world, for the
most part, has been satisfied to
minister to the needs of the soul. The
majority of people and institutions
were content to have it so. Indeed,
this split is so ingrained in our
thinking it seems right and proper.
The Faith Factor in Healing
provides us with a different view, a
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larger map in which the lines between
mind and body are no longer so
clearly drawn but are interrelated,
encountering and influencing one
another in the deepest recesses of our
mind, body, and spirit in ways we are
only beginning to understand .
Droege's background as a pastor,
professor of theology, and his
appointment as Valparaiso University
Research Professor in 1988-89 for
study in the healing arts, admirably
equips him for the position of our
guide through this new territory.
Researchers in Psychoneuroimmunology,
a new branch of
behavioral
medicine,
have
documented the relationship between
the central nervous system and the
immune system. Evidence for the
placebo effect is incontrovertible but
often misconstrued as being effective
only for neurotic individuals. What
has been lacking in the literature to
this point has been a focus on the faith
factor. Faith as "expectant trust" is
present in secular healing as well as
religious imaging, in which they can
rediscover and renew the experience
of "Christ the Healer" and the power
and the presence of God, "the source
of all healing, medical or churchly."
It is part of the human condition
to search for meaning in life.
Physicians are recognizing the
importance of listening to the whole
story of their patients' illness rather
than a list of symptoms. Christians
have as the foundation of their
individual stories: creation, which
brings with it the gift of life and
health, and the mending of broken
creation through the cross and
resurrection of Christ. How we can
more deeply experience this
relationship through imagery is the
thrust of this thoughtful book.
Droege reminds us that the
Scriptures are full of rich images which
Christians use for their prayers and
preaching.
Drawing on these
resources, guided imagery can be an
effective method for experiencing the
healing grace of God and the
deepening of Christian commitment.
He suggests that the use of imagery be
"subjected to the same scrutiny as

preaching or any other form of witness
to the gospel to ensure its faithfulness
to the norm of Scripture." Including
the "resurrection life of Christ" at the
center of our images will insure that
we keep in tune with what God wants
for us as we look with "expectant trust"
to God's promise of healing and
wholeness.
Bettye Youngjohn

Stanley Hauerwas, Naming the Silences:
God, Medicine, and the Problem of
Suffering. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
1990, 154 pp., $9.95.
This is an impressive little book.
My admiration for Hauerwas,
combined with my need to find a
suitable text for discussing the
problem of suffering with my
freshman theology classes, led me to
use Naming the Silences as a basic
resource. On many counts the choice
was vindicated.
Much of the book is made up of
stories about ill and dying children.
The first chapter is an examination of
Peter DeVrie's The Blood of the Lamb,
the story of the misfortunes of Don
Wanderhope culminating in the death
from leukemia of his 11-year-old
daughter Carol; chapters two and
three are commentaries upon it,
supplemented by a look at Where is God
When a Child Suffers1, by Penny
Giesbrecht, by a discussion of Myra
Bluebond-Langer's The Private Worlds
of Dying Children, and Nicholas
Wolterstorofrs Lament for a Son. That
the book is replete with such stories is
its basic argument.
The suffering of children is
especially poignant and baffling.
Involuntarily we ask "Why?" and
invariably an answer eludes us. There
follow only the silences of the book's
title. Commonly an attempt is made to
name those silences when suffering is
explained as the result of the bad
choices we have made, or again when
suffering is regarded as a punishment
for sins we have committed. But these
fail when we must face a dying friend,
The Cresset

or more especially a dying child.
These may help to understand our
general disorder; they do nothing to
explain the particularity of any given
terminal illness.
Hauerwas does not attempt to
explain the evil, nor does he explain
why a good and all-powerful God
allows us to undergo suffering for
seemingly no reason. Rather what the
silences call for is a way to live with
them. What is needed is that we be
enabled to place the story of pointless
suffering alongside a story that helps
us to know that we are not thereby
abandoned. That story is the story of
the God who not only created us, but
whom we also find manifested in the
calling of Israel and in the life, cross,
and resurrection ofjesus ofNazareth.
This central line of argument my
freshmen could follow and appreciate.
They resonated in particular to the
stories and case studies Hauerwas
employs, especially to The Blood of the
Lamlr, a few even admitted to weeping
while reading the first chapter .
Harder for them to follow were some
of his more theoretical analyses. The
value of these increase, as every college
teacher must believe, in proportion as
there is growth and maturity.
I found it particularly helpful
when Hauerwas surveyed the history of
Christian thinking about the problem
of evil. Neither for Paul, nor for
Augustine, nor for the medieval
theologians did a benevolent divine
omnipotence and the existence of evil
interpose an obstacle to belief. That
came about with the Enlightenment,

February 1992

with its confidence that the rational
and sensible person, without the aid of
special divine revelation or a
community gathered around such a
revelation, could know God and God's
working. That confidence exerted its
corrosive influence upon Christianity.
Now, "rather than being a set of
convictions about God's work in Jesus
Christ requiring conversion and
membership in a community,
Christianity became that set of beliefs
which explains why the way things are
is the way things were meant to be for
any right-thinking person, converted
or not" (55). "The problem of evil is
thus not a single problem; it makes all
the difference which god one worships
as well as how one thinks that god is
known" (51).
Similarly, when Hauerwas
inquires of contemporary audiences
how they would like to die, he most
frequently receives the answer,
"painlessly," "quickly," "in my sleep."
Yet in the medieval world a sudden
death was most to be feared, for one
could not make the necessary spiritual
preparations. We moderns have lost,
he argues, a vision of the good death.
And this loss is related to the loss of a
common narrative which can help us
see our lives as something more than
mere (and lengthening) chronicity,
but also as a human life-span which
includes our death. And precisely at
that point medicine, which is
dedicated to the cure of disease
instead of to the care of the patient, is
powerless to help; indeed, because of
its mythology it may even be harmful.

I am confident that freshmen of
all ages will find this a thoughtful and
illuminating Christian reflection upon
the perennial problem of human
suffering, and in particular the
problem of children's suffering. A
final excerpt will whet your appetite:
"We have no theodicy that can soften
the pain of our death and the death of
our children, but we believe that we
share a common story which makes it
possible for us to be with one another,
especially as we die. There can be no
way to remove the loneliness of the
death of leukemic children unless they
see witnessed in the lives of those who
care for them a confidence rooted in
friendship with God and with one
another. That, finally, is the only
response we have to 'the problem' of
the death of our children" ( 148).
Walter E. Keller

Notes on Poets
0 Rita Signorelli Pappas lives in
Valparaiso where she writes and
teaches. Her poetry has appeared in
Poetry Northwest, Women's Studies
Qy.arterly and San jose Studies.
Etc The Editor thanks alert reader
and bassist Chris Hanson for noticing
that the Miles Davis album referred to
in Sam Chell's piece in the December
1991 issue is Kind of Blue. Though if
you have to have a typo, king of blue
isn't bad. 0
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